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I.  INTRODUCTION 
An important tort liability issue currently under debate in Ohio is 
whether negligent agents must be named as defendants in any action 
seeking to hold a principal liable for medical malpractice.1  Both 
plaintiffs and defendants have requested clarification of the current law 
in Ohio.2  This article takes the position that the Ohio Supreme Court 
should not require a negligent agent be a named defendant in order to 
extend liability to the principal. 
The purpose of tort liability for medical malpractice is two-fold:  
“to deter inappropriate, incompetent or unprofessional conduct” and to 
make victims whole by compensating them for the losses they incur.3  
One method of achieving this purpose is to place responsibility on the 
one who has the most to gain through the employee’s actions.  
Respondeat superior is a doctrine that imputes to the employer the 
actions of the tortfeasor, if those acts were performed within the scope of 
employment.4  It is a doctrine that has changed and developed over time, 
 
 1. There is currently a split between the circuits regarding how to answer this question.  See, 
e.g., Taylor v. Belmont Cmty. Hosp., 2010-Ohio-3986 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist.) (allowing a claim 
to proceed against the hospital without the addition of the negligent agents); Henry v. Mandell-
Brown, 2010-Ohio-3832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist.) (claim barred for failure to name negligent 
physician as a party defendant), appeal not accepted, 940 N.E.2d 987 (Table); Tisdale v. Toledo 
Hosp., No. CI 03-4247 (Ohio C.P. Lucas Cnty. 2010), appeal filed, No. 11-1005 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th 
Dist. Jan. 10, 2011) (trial court found claim barred because of failure to name negligent parties); 
Stanley v. Cmty. Hosp., 2011-Ohio-1290 (Ohio Ct. App. 2nd Dist.) (allowing a claim to proceed 
against the hospital where the parties not named were nurses and therefore employees of the 
hospital), appeal not accepted, 951 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 2011).  See also infra Part IV.A.  By 
declining jurisdiction recently in both Mandell-Brown and Stanley, the Ohio Supreme Court missed 
two opportunities to clarify the current state of the law.   
 2. See Mandell-Brown, No. 2010-1861 (Ohio filed Feb. 2, 2011), appeal not accepted, 940 
N.E.2d 987 (Ohio 2011).  Plaintiff appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court after the court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the medical facility, based on the 
decision in National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 913 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 
2009).  See also Stanley, No. 2011-0711 (filed Aug. 24, 2011), appeal not accepted, 951 N.E.2d 
1047 (Ohio 2011).  Plaintiff sued the hospital and unnamed nurses and the trial court granted 
summary judgment relying on Wuerth.  Id.  The Court of Appeals for the Second District reversed.  
Id.  Defendant, Community Hospital, appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, requesting 
clarification of Wuerth.  Id.  See infra note 220.  The Supreme Court of Ohio denied jurisdiction in 
both cases and the question remains open for the court to resolve. 
 3. Thomas May & Mark P. Aulisio, Medical Malpractice, Mistake Prevention, and 
Compensation, 11 KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS JOURNAL, 135, 135-46 (2001). 
 4. State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cnty. Ct. of Com. Pl., 931 N.E.2d 1082, 1088-89 (Ohio 
2010).  “The doctrine of respondeat superior operates by imputing to the employer the acts of the 
tortfeasor, not the tortfeasor’s liability.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
2
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especially regarding a hospital’s liability for the medical malpractice of 
those treating hospital patients.   
In 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court decided a case that had the power 
to make a drastic change in the application of respondeat superior to 
medical malpractice cases.5  The case merely analogized to medical 
malpractice, not deciding any issues of medicine, hospitals, or medical 
malpractice.  Yet it created a sharp divide between Ohio’s appellate 
courts regarding how to handle medical malpractice cases.  The case that 
set the stage for massive confusion regarding the current law of 
respondeat superior was National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA 
v. Wuerth.6  In Wuerth, the certified question presented was “whether a 
law firm may be held vicariously liable for malpractice when none of its 
principals or employees are liable for malpractice or have been named as 
defendants.”7  The Ohio Supreme Court answered the question in the 
negative.8  In determining whether malpractice liability existed for a law 
firm without the individual lawyer-defendant, the court analogized to 
medical malpractice law, then cited the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers,9 relying on the commentary in determining that 
there was no liability for the law firm.10  The court determined that the 
negligent lawyer must be a named defendant and created a new 
limitation on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
This essay discusses the application of this new limitation to the 
field of medical malpractice, the divergent results reached by Ohio’s 
appellate courts in the medical negligence and malpractice context since 
Wuerth, and the various treatments by other jurisdictions.  This essay 
argues that the holding in Wuerth narrowly applies only to law firms, 
and that applying it to medical malpractice results in a reversal of the 
 
 5. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 913 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 2009).  The 
case addressed both direct and vicarious liability.  This essay examines the effect of the portion of 
the decision applying specifically to vicarious liability as it applies to medical malpractice.  Wuerth 
held that a vicarious liability claim against a law firm could not stand unless the negligent partner or 
associate was a named defendant in the suit.  Id. at 945.   
 6. Id. at 939.  See infra Part III. 
 7. Id. at 942. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 945 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58.1 
(2000) (stating that a “law firm is subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by 
any wrongful act or omission of any principal or employee of the firm who was acting in the 
ordinary course of the firm’s business or with actual or apparent authority”)). 
 10. Id. at 945 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58 cmt. 
a (2000)).  The Ohio Supreme Court found that the comment emphasized that the vicarious liability 
of a law firm “presupposes that a firm principal or employee is liable on one or more claims . . . and 
considers when the firm itself and each of its principals share in that liability.”  Id. 
3
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settled Ohio law and injustice for those injured by the negligence of 
medical professionals. 
Part II examines the history of hospital liability and traces the 
changes in vicarious liability up to the Wuerth decision.  Part III 
discusses the Wuerth case, laying out the foundation for a change in the 
accepted doctrines of medical malpractice.  Part IV examines the various 
interpretations of Wuerth, the results of applying the narrow decision 
laid out in Wuerth to medical malpractice, and the policies behind 
respondeat superior that caution against this expanded interpretation of 
Wuerth’s holding.  Part V of this essay concludes that Wuerth should not 
be applied in the medical malpractice context. 
II.  HISTORY OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY IN OHIO 
A. The historical hospital was a charity organization, servicing the 
poor and unwanted in society. 
Hospitals did not start out as the pristine and efficient buildings we 
see today.  Made of glass and steel with their polished floors and 
sterilized environments, the hospital of today is only a distant cousin of 
the original hospitals of the United States.  Most hospitals in the early 
nineteenth century functioned as temporary emergency institutions that 
were set up to address epidemic outbreaks.11  As permanent hospitals 
developed, they became places for people who had nowhere else to go, 
such as immigrants or those with “morally suspect diseases.”12  Most 
people who fell sick or were injured were treated in their own homes by 
doctors who made visits, bringing their equipment and medication with 
 
 11. See David Rosner, Moral Medicine: New York Hospitals in the 1800’s, FATHOM (2002), 
http://www.fathom.com/feature/121638/index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (discussing the 
evolution of hospitals from the 1800’s).  David Rosner is a Ronald H. Lauterstein Professor of 
Sociomedical Sciences and professor of history at Columbia University and is also Co-Director of 
the Center for the History & Ethics of Public Health at Columbia’s Mailman School of Public 
Health.  He was a University Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New 
York.  Rosner is the author of A Once Charitable Enterprise (1982; 1987) and the editor of Hives of 
Sickness: Epidemics and Public Health in New York City (1995) and Health Care in America: 
Essays in Social History (with Susan Reverby).  Mailman School of Public Health, Our Faculty: 
David Rosner, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (2011), http://www.mailman.columbia.edu/our-
faculty/profile?uni=dr289 (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).   
 12. Rosner, supra note 11.  Often, when the ports would close for the winter, the laid-off 
workers who were sick or despondent would end up in the city hospitals, seeking refuge, shelter, 
and care.  Syphilis and tuberculosis patients are two examples of patients that were viewed as 
“morally suspect.”  Id.  It was believed that the only remedy was “long term, intensive retraining, 
moral persuasion, and praying.”  Id. 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/7
12- WESIG MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  10:01 AM 
2012] USING IT FOR ALL IT’S WUERTH 345 
them.13  Most Americans even gave birth and endured surgery at home.14  
“Respectable” people would never go to a hospital; the lowest classes of 
society sought help in these facilities, which were often only a separate 
wing of an almshouse.15   
Most hospitals were private charities run by trustee boards.16  The 
public hospital, like the private one, was historically a charity—a 
community effort to “shelter and care for the chronically ill, deprived, 
and disabled.”17  These hospitals served a meritorious function, 
providing refuge for the poor and the dying.18  Patients seeking help 
from these locations could not pay and had nowhere else to go.19 
Funds were extremely low for these facilities and most of the 
hospital’s “staff” were former patients.20  “Doctors, who were not paid, 
tended the ill for a few hours per week out of a sense of charity mixed 
with the knowledge that they could ‘practice’ their cures on the poor and 
charge young medical students for instruction in the healing arts.”21  
“The hospital[s] of this time were dirty, crowded and full of contagious 
disease.”22   
 
 13. Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ohio 1994). 
 14. History of Public Hospitals in the United States, NAT’L ASS’N OF PUBLIC HOSP. AND 
HEALTH SYSTEMS (NAPH) (2009), http://naph.org/homepage-sections/explore/history.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
 15. Southview, 628 N.E.2d at 51.  An almshouse was a house for the poor, endowed by 
charity for the aged and infirm who had no family to take care of them.  Almshouse, 
DICTIONARY.COM (2011), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/almshouse (last visited Oct. 16, 
2011) (based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2011).   
 16. Rosner, supra note 11.  Private hospitals were often built as religious and moral 
institutions that served the poor as charity cases, attempting to heal their spiritual as well as physical 
ails.  Id.  
 17. NAPH, supra note 14. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Rosner, supra note 11.  “[T]he average stay at a private hospital was two to three months; 
some patients stayed for years.”  Id.  The patients could not just lie around for such an extended 
period of time, and so as patients began to heal, they would be expected to attend to the more 
critical patients.  Id. 
 21. Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ohio 1994). 
 22. Id.  See also Rosner, supra note 11.  Rosner explains that the germ theory was not adopted 
until the late 1800s.  Id.  Until this time, hospitals lacked the understanding of how to create sterile 
environments.  Id.  During surgery nurses would be covered from head to foot and wear rubber 
gloves because they were morally suspicious while doctors, who were viewed as too moral to 
transmit disease, would operate in bare hands with no mask or cap.  Id.  Instead, the hospitals used 
“efficiency” means such as reusing patient bandages, rinsing and drying them before applying them 
to the next patient.  Id. 
5
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B. The doctrine of charitable immunity developed from the nature of 
historical hospitals. 
Hospitals were considered charities based on the willingness of a 
small number of doctors to volunteer their time to treat destitute 
patients.23  Because of this, courts tended to view hospitals as immune 
from liability for any negligence.24  The doctrine of charitable immunity 
for hospitals was established in 1876.25  It served to protect hospitals as 
charitable institutions and granted them absolute immunity from any and 
all negligent acts of physicians, nurses, and hospital personnel.26  The 
concept of charitable immunity derived from “the theory that charitable 
funds could not be diverted from the use intended by their donors.”27  
This common law immunity included the idea that respondeat superior 
did not apply to hospitals because “the hospital derived no benefit from 
the physicians’ services.”28   
Even after some patients began paying for services, the doctrine of 
charitable immunity continued.29  Courts considered the hospital a 
“Good Samaritan.”30  The courts reasoned that one who accepted the 
benefit from a charity unconditionally agreed to an implied waiver, 
which exempted the charity from liability for the negligence of its 
servants.31  Although the implied waiver theory began with patients who 
received services free of charge, it soon reached all people seeking 
 
 23. Elizabeth Isbey, Note, Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc. and the Emergence of Hospital 
Liability for Negligent Independent-Contractor Physicians in North Carolina, 43 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1127, 1130 (2008). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Roger N. Braden & Jennifer L. Lawrence, Medical Malpractice: Understanding the 
Evolution—Rebuking the Revolution, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 675, 678 (1998) (discussing how 
malpractice litigation has changed, and its impacts on society). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ohio 1994).  The 
theory originated in mid-nineteenth century England.  Id.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 50-51.   
 30. Id. at 51 (citing Morrison v. Henke, 160 N.W. 173, 175 (Wis. 1917) (overruled by Kojis v. 
Doctors Hosp., 107 N.W. 2d 131 (Wis. 1961)).  The court stated that “[s]ince [a hospital] ministers 
to those who cannot pay as well as those who can, thus acting as a Good Samaritan, justice and 
sound public policy alike dictate that it should be exempt from the liability attaching to masters 
whose only aim is to engage in enterprises of profit or of self-interest.”  Id.  
 31. Jane Elaine Ballerini, Comment, The Apparent Agency Doctrine in Connecticut’s Medical 
Malpractice Jurisprudence: Using Legal Doctrine as a Platform for Change, 13 QUINNIPIAC 
HEALTH L.J. 317, 322 (2010) (discussing the results of the application of vicarious liability to 
hospitals).  See also Puma v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 98 Civ 2130, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12589, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2000) (stating that prior to 1957, New York courts stated 
that “a person who seeks and accepts charity should be deemed to have waived any right to damages 
for injuries sustained through the negligence of his benefactor’s servants”). 
6
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service at the hospital—whether paying or not and regardless of whether 
they were conscious at the time of admittance.32  The concept of a 
barrier between hospital activities and direct health care justified 
hospital immunity from liability.33  Hospitals were seen as removed from 
the actual care of patients.34  Instead, they were viewed as simply 
providing facilities where physicians practiced their art.35 
C. Changes in society resulted in changing norms, perceptions, and 
expectations regarding hospital care. 
In the early twentieth century, hospitals began to shift from 
charities to for-profit corporations.36  As hospitals became business 
entities attempting to increase their profit margins, the original rationale 
for imposing charitable immunity dissipated.37  Hospitals no longer 
merely provide the facilities where physicians practiced their 
professions.38  The modern hospital is a “corporate institution that takes 
the role of a comprehensive health care center that must provide and 
monitor all aspects of health care.”39  Hospitals address comprehensive 
and sophisticated health-care concerns, providing a plethora of services 
including research, teaching, diagnosis, and therapy.40 
The public view of hospitals has also changed over time.  “[T]he 
most important driver in the shift in public perception has been 
 
 32. Ballerini, supra note 31, at 322.   
 33. Id.  The widespread assumptions about the relationship between “hospitals and physicians 
helped to blanket hospitals from liability when medical providers committed errors.”  Id. at 323.  
This began to change as insurance became available to hospitals.  Id. 
 34. Id. at 322.  “Hospitals took an approach to health care services that was one step removed 
from patients, and as such, they were not generally considered direct health care providers.”  Id.     
 35. Id. 
 36. Braden & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 681. 
 37. Id.  See also Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 52 (Ohio 
1994) (discussing the abolishment of the charitable immunity doctrine in Ohio).  The court states 
that “[t]he average nonprofit hospital of today is a large well run corporation, and, in many 
instances, the hospital is so ‘businesslike’ in its monetary requirements for entrance, and in its 
collections of accounts, that a shadow is thrown upon the word ‘charity.’”  Id. (quoting Avellone v. 
St. John’s Hosp., 135 N.E.2d 410, 415 (Ohio 1956)). 
 38. James W. Gustafson Jr. & Thomas D. Masterson, Suing the Hospital when Superdoc 
Falls, 38 TRIAL 20, 21-22 (May 1, 2002) (discussing the need to hold hospitals liable).  “The 
concept is simple: A hospital that spends thousands of dollars a year advertising the quality of its 
physicians to attract patients should not escape liability for the negligence of those physicians, even 
when they are not hospital employees.”  Id. at 20. 
 39. David H. Rutchik, Note, The Emerging Trend of Corporate Liability: Courts’ Uneven 
Treatment of Hospital Standards Leaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 535, 
538 (1994) (suggesting that the appropriate level of hospital liability should be the highest level of 
hospital liability—corporate liability). 
 40. Id. 
7
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hospitals’ marketing of themselves . . . as full-service healthcare 
providers.”41  Hospitals’ advertisements encourage patients to choose 
them based on their state-of-the-art equipment and top rated 
physicians.42  
[H]ospitals increasingly hold themselves out to the public in expensive 
advertising campaigns as offering and rendering quality health 
services.  One need only pick up a daily newspaper to see full- and 
half-page advertisements extolling the medical virtues of an individual 
hospital and the quality health care that the hospital is prepared to 
deliver in any number of medial areas.  Modern hospitals have spent 
billions of dollars marketing themselves, nurturing the image with the 
consuming public that they are full-care modern health facilities.  All 
of these expenditures have but one purpose: to persuade those in need 
of medical services to obtain those services at a specific hospital.43 
Hospitals spend billions of dollars each year to advertise their 
facilities and services.44  Hospitals receive substantial benefits from 
granting physicians staff privileges, promoting them as “our doctors,” 
and suggesting that their facility is better because of the doctors they 
“employ.”45  Consumers of medical services view the physicians who 
treat them as an integral part of the hospital and the hospital itself as a 
place to seek and receive quality medical care.46  Hospitals are “in the 
business of providing medical treatment [and health care] . . . an 
individual enters the hospital for no other reason than to seek 
treatment.”47  The shifting perception of the role of hospitals has resulted 
in major changes in the law regarding hospital liability. 
D. The United States experienced a general movement toward 
increasing hospital liability for the negligent care of hospital 
patients. 
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, various states throughout 
the country struggled over what to do with the developing law of 
 
 41. Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liability for Torts of 
Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. REV. 431, 436 (1996). 
 42. See Gustafson & Masterson, supra note 38, at 21. 
 43. See id. (citing Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Wis. 1992)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 20-21. 
 46. Id. at 21. 
 47. Braden & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 685 (emphasis added).  The perception of hospitals 
has changed so that they are no longer seen to merely oversee the actions of doctors and nurses, but 
are responsible for the treatment provided.  Id.   
8
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hospital liability.  In 1957, the New York Court of Appeals decided the 
landmark case Bing v. Thunig.48  In Bing, New York’s highest court 
determined that “[t]he rule of nonliability [regarding hospitals] is out of 
tune with the life about us, at variance with modern-day needs and with 
concepts of justice and fair dealing.  It should be discarded.”49  The Bing 
court established that hospitals should be subject to the same rules of 
respondeat superior as all other employers when determining liability 
for negligence or medical malpractice.50   
Illinois began its shift in 1964 with the decision in Darling v. 
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, in which the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that “charitable immunity [could] no longer 
stand.”51  Over the next forty years, the courts expanded upon the 
doctrines of hospital liability, including agency liability.52  The changes 
resulted in “a quantum leap improvement over time in the quality of 
health care in the United States.”53 
Courts in Kentucky have held that hospitals owe a duty of care to 
their patients to protect them from negligence, whether from hospital 
employees, physicians, or from independent contractors.54  As the law in 
Kentucky evolved, there was a general recognition that the changing role 
of hospitals meant a greater likelihood that patients would seek medical 
 
 48. 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957) (holding that the doctrine of hospital immunity for the 
negligence of its employees should be abandoned, and that hospital liability should be governed by 
the same principles of law as all other employee-employer relationships). 
 49. Id. at 9. 
 50. See id. 
 51. 211 N.E.2d 253, 257, 260 (Ill. 1965).  See also Mitchell J. Wiet, J.D., Darling v. 
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital and its Legacy, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 399, 400 (2005) 
(discussing the impact of the Darling decision on hospital liability over four decades).  In 
examining the ramifications of Darling, Wiet noted that “hospital entities themselves, acting 
through both their employees and independent (non-employed) medical staff members, undertake to 
treat patients and that in their capacity as providers of care, hospitals owe separate duties of care to 
their patients directly . . . which, if violated, will result in liability for the hospital entity.”  Id. at 400 
(citing Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257). 
 52. See Wiet, supra note 51, at 400-06.  “The impact of Darling and its progeny over the last 
four decades has transformed hospital liability jurisprudence and will likely continue to do so.”  Id. 
at 408.   
 53. Id. at 408.   
 54. See Braden & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 682 (discussing the changing role of hospital 
liability in Kentucky).  Braden also addresses the history of hospitals and the charitable immunity 
doctrine, the lack of incentive for hospitals to improve medical care as their focus shifted from 
assistance of the needy to the bottom line, and the shift in liability as perceptions of hospitals 
changed.  Id. at 676-86.  See also Williams v. St. Clair Med. Ctr., 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1983) (distinguished by Johnston v. Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Sys., No. 2002-CA-1812-
MR, 2003 WL 22681562, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2003)); Rogers v. Kasdan, 612 S.W.2d 133, 
135-36 (Ky. 1981). 
9
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care from institutions rather than individual health care providers.55  The 
law in Kentucky changed to reflect the changing role of hospitals within 
society, and the courts held that “today hospitals are responsible for the 
treatment provided.”56 
North Carolina courts have adopted a less stringent standard to hold 
a hospital liable.  However, its doctrine has several holes that await 
resolution and clarification by the North Carolina Supreme Court.57   
Individual jurisdictions in Connecticut have applied agency theories 
for hospital liability, but the Connecticut Supreme Court has yet to 
create a uniform doctrine.58 
Rhode Island has “joined the majority of states holding hospitals 
more accountable . . .”59  The Rhode Island Supreme Court added 
corporate negligence and apparent authority as available theories to 
extend liability to hospitals, thereby striking a balance between 
 
 55. Braden & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 685 (citing Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 
(Miss. 1985) (stating that hospitals are no longer “mere physical facilities where physicians practice 
their profession”)). 
 56. Id. (citing Beeck v.Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P. 2d 1153, 1157 (Az. App. 1972)).  See, e.g., 
Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985) (holding that a hospital was liable for the 
negligence of emergency room physicians using ostensible agency); Williams, 657 S.W.2d 590 
(extending ostensible agency to create hospital liability). 
 57. See generally Isbey, supra note 23.  See, e.g., Willoughby v. Wilkins, 310 S.E.2d 90 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a hospital’s assertion that the independent-contractor physician would 
perform services in the “best interest” of the hospital was sufficient to create a question of fact 
regarding an employee-employer relationship); cf. Hylton v. Koontz, 532 S.E.2d 252, 257-58 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to find an employment relationship despite an agreement similar to that in 
Willoughby); Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc., 628 S.E.2d 851, 857-63 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) 
(discussing the changing role of hospitals and the application of apparent agency, finding that the 
hospital need only hold itself out as a provider of care to satisfy the reliance prong of agency by 
estoppel, thereby significantly lowering the burden of proof required to hold the hospital liable). 
 58. See Ballerini, supra note 31, at 353-54 (quoting Franciso v. Hartford Gynecological Ctr., 
Inc., 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 521, at *10 (Mar. 1, 1994) (reasoning that “a hospital holds itself 
out as performing a whole variety of medical procedures; [thus,] the doctrine of apparent authority 
is held to apply” when medical personnel negligently perform particular aspects of those 
procedures));  see, e.g., LeConche v. Elligers, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1693, at *8 (July 16, 1991) 
(holding that a hospital might be liable for its staff physician’s negligence based on the changing 
role of hospitals in society); Menzie v. Windham Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 774 F. Supp. 91, 96-97 (D. 
Conn. 1991) (impliedly recognizing the applicability of the apparent agency doctrine against a 
hospital for the negligence of a physician); Franciso, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 521, at *11-13 
(dispensing with the need for showing reliance in order to prove an ostensible agency claim); Kafi 
v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, No. 3:98cv720 (AHN), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22657, at *13 (D. Conn. 
Feb. 24, 2000) (requiring reasonable reliance to establish apparent agency). 
 59. Philip S. Lotane, Comment, Tort Law—Rhode Island Considers Apparent Authority and 
Corporate Negligence Doctrines in Medical Malpractice Actions—Rodrigues v. Miriam Hospital, 
28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 474, 483-84 (1994). 
10
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protecting patients and holding hospitals responsible for the negligent 
acts of their physicians.60 
E. The doctrine of vicarious liability for hospitals developed in Ohio 
as the courts began to recognize the shift in perception and the 
growing need to hold hospitals liable. 
Consistent with the national trend, a hospital in Ohio was 
historically immune from negligence liability through the doctrine of 
charitable immunity.61  The doctrine of charitable immunity 
“discouraged litigation, thus making it impossible for an innocent 
patient-victim who had received a devastating injury as a result of the 
hospital staff’s negligence to receive any compensation.”62  At least one 
commentator has opined that “hospitals had little incentive to improve 
medical care”63 or to establish standards of care for their employees 
because of this encompassing protection.64  In time, patients began 
paying for their care and hospitals began to focus on the “bottom line,”65 
shifting focus from the charitable purpose of assisting the poor and 
downtrodden to the lofty goal of becoming “corporate giants and 
financial empires.”66  At the same time, there was a recognized change 
in how hospitals were viewed by patients.  They no longer believed that 
nurses and physicians were acting on their own authority; rather they 
had come to expect that the hospital itself would attempt to cure them.67  
As this shift took place, Ohio’s charitable immunity doctrine began to 
erode and hospitals gradually became liable for patient injuries caused 
by negligence.68  Hospitals, as health care institutions, were held to owe 
 
 60. Id. at 476-84.  See Rodrigues v. Miriam Hosp., 623 A.2d 456 (R.I. 1993) (established 
corporate negligence theory while holding the evidence failed to demonstrate the required 
knowledge and refusing to apply the new doctrine). 
 61. Comer v. Risko, 833 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ohio 2005). 
 62. Braden & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 678. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 678-79.  Because hospitals enjoyed this immunity, they were protected from 
responsibility for the negligent acts of the staff, including physicians, nurses, and all other hospital 
personnel.  Id. at 678.  This resulted in a lack of incentive to improve medical care or establish and 
enforce standards of care for their employees and independent contractors.  Id. at 678-79. 
 65. Id. at 679.   
 66. Id.  “As more and more hospitals grew into medical centers they disinherited their 
backgrounds as charitable organizations,” and began to focus on financial gain and growth.  Id. 
 67. Wiet, supra note 51, at 404-05 (quoting Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 
N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965)). 
 68. Braden & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 679. 
11
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a duty of care to the patients to whom they provided medical care.69  
“The evolution of this . . . liability . . . gradually extended to physicians, 
whether employees of the hospital or independent contractors.”70 
In the 1950s, charitable immunity in Ohio was abolished, and the 
courts imposed liability on hospitals for the negligence of their 
employees through the theory of respondeat superior.71  The adoption of 
this doctrine allowed patients to hold hospitals responsible for the 
actions of their employees, but the effects were limited because most 
physicians contracted with hospitals to provide services and were not 
considered employees.72   
Beginning in 1990, Ohio courts began to look to agency theories to 
attempt to expand the liability of hospitals as they grew in size and 
importance within the community.73  Ohio adopted agency by estoppel 
in order to hold a hospital liable for the actions of its independent 
contractors.74  Four years later, based on the growth of the full-service 
hospital, its use of media advertising, and public expectations, the Ohio 
Supreme Court continued to extend hospital liability, creating a less 
stringent test for agency by estoppel.75 
 
 
 69. Id. at 682; Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1045 (Ohio 1990), overruled on 
other grounds, Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994). 
 70. Braden & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 682. 
 71. Id. at 680-82.  See, e.g., Avellone v. St. John’s Hosp., 135 N.E.2d 410, 417 (Ohio 1956) 
(holding that a not for profit hospital was subject to the doctrine of respondeat superior and liable 
for the torts of its servants, but refusing to determine whether this liability extended to those actors 
for whom the hospital had no right of control); Klema v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp. of Youngstown, 166 
N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1960) (removing the distinction between administrative and medical negligence 
for the purpose of extending liability through respondeat superior).  However, the doctrine of 
respondeat superior did not provide hospital liability for independent contractors.  Braden & 
Lawrence, supra note 25, at 680-81. 
 72. Id. at 684. 
 73. Comer v. Risko, 833 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ohio 2005).  
 74. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1047-51.  The Ohio Supreme Court determined that agency by 
estoppel would apply to independent contractors of hospitals if the plaintiff could show that “(1) the 
hospital made representations leading the plaintiff to believe that the negligent physician was 
operating as an agent under the hospital’s authority and (2) the plaintiff was thereby induced to rely 
upon the ostensible agency relationship.”  Id. at 1049. 
 75. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 716.  Comer discussed how the decision in Clark v. Southview 
Hospital & Family Health Center, 628 N.E.2d 46, partially overruled Albain v. Flower Hospital, 
553 N.E.2d 1038, holding that Albain made it almost impossible for a plaintiff to establish reliance 
and declaring that the test established in that case was too narrow.  Southview relaxed the test for 
agency by estoppel and required only that a hospital hold itself out to the public as a medical 
services provider and that the patient look to the hospital for care, as opposed to a specific 
physician.  Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 716. 
12
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1. The Ohio Supreme Court significantly expands Ohio’s doctrine 
of hospital liability. 
Although the Ohio Supreme Court took initial steps toward hospital 
liability for the acts of physicians, it was still a practical impossibility to 
hold a hospital responsible for the acts of its independent contractors 
under the stringent test the court established.76  In the 1990 case, Albain 
v. Flower Hospital, a young girl in her eighth month of pregnancy began 
bleeding and went to the hospital emergency room.77  She was assigned 
to the on call obstetrician, who was contacted at approximately 2:30 in 
the afternoon.78  The obstetrician was contacted several times, but 
finished her normal office hours at her practice, went home and had 
dinner, and did not arrive at the hospital until approximately 8:00 in the 
evening.79  She then ordered the girl to be transferred to another hospital 
that had a neonatologist on staff.80  The baby was delivered by cesarean 
section and suffered complications due to the delay, which ultimately 
resulted in death.81  The court found that, although agency by estoppel 
was an appropriate theory to extend liability to the hospital for physician 
negligence, in this case there was no evidence that the hospital held the 
obstetrician out as an employee, nor any evidence that the plaintiff relied 
on the relationship of the obstetrician as a hospital employee in choosing 
 
 76. See Albain, 553 N.E.2d 1038.  Justice Holmes discussed the development of the agency 
by estoppel theory as applied to hospitals in medical malpractice cases.  Id. at 1048-51.  He 
determined that although it did apply in this case, in order to prove agency by estoppel, a plaintiff 
must show:  “(1) the hospital made representations leading the plaintiff to believe that the negligent 
physician was operating as an agent under the hospital’s authority and (2) the plaintiff was thereby 
induced to rely upon the . . . agency relationship.”  Id. at 1049.  The court then acknowledged in a 
footnote that this element of the reliance would be extremely difficult if not impossible to meet 
because most patients either choose their hospital based on convenience of location or occasionally 
by reputation, but few (if any) would choose their hospital based on the employment structure of the 
hospital, and if the physician was part of the consideration in choosing a specific hospital, it is more 
likely the expertise and skill of the physician rather than the employment status were the deciding 
factors.  Id. at 1050 n.12.  In making this determination, Albain effectively eliminated the use of 
agency by estoppel to hold hospitals liable for the negligence of independent-contractor physicians.  
Id.   
 77. Id. at 1040.  Sharon Albain began bleeding vaginally and was transported by ambulance to 
the nearest hospital and arrived at Flower Hospital at 2:00 p.m.  Id. at 1040-41.   
 78. Id. at 1041.  Sharon’s family practice physician was contacted but didn’t have staff 
privileges at the hospital and wasn’t permitted to assist.  Id.  Sharon’s care was turned over to the 
on-call obstetrician for the hospital.  Id.  She had no choice in which physician attended her.  Id.  
 79. Id. The obstetrician was advised regarding Sharon’s condition and said that she would be 
in after she finished her regular office hours at 5:30.  Id.  She was contacted again at home at 7:00 
and told she had been expected since 5:30.  Id.  
 80. Id.   
 81. Id.  The cesarean was not performed until 11:49 p.m. and the delay caused a prolonged 
lack of oxygen to the baby.  Id. 
13
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the hospital.82  Although the physician’s negligence resulted in the death 
of the plaintiff’s child, the hospital was not liable for the actions of the 
“staff physician” that provided for the care of its patient.83  Thus the 
plaintiff was not permitted to recover for the negligent treatment she 
received.84 
Clark v. Southview Hospital,85 decided in 1994, overruled Albain 
and established a new test for agency by estoppel, allowing liability to 
attach to a hospital if the hospital held itself out to the public as a 
provider of medical services and the patient looked to the hospital, rather 
than a specific physician, to provide medical care.86   
In this case, a young woman drove to Southview Hospital suffering 
from an asthma attack and died due to the allegedly negligent treatment 
of the emergency-room physician on duty.87  The mother of the deceased 
filed a complaint alleging wrongful death as a result of “medical 
negligence on the part of Southview through its agents and/or 
employees, Dr. Mucci and [his corporate entity,] TMES.”88  The mother 
settled her claims against Dr. Mucci and TMES, and they were 
dismissed from the case.89  The case then proceeded against Southview 
 
 82. Id. at 1050-51.  “There is absolutely no indication in the record here that [Albain] would 
have refused [the on call obstetrician’s] care if she had known [the obstetrician] was not an 
employee of the hospital.”  Id. at 1050.  
 83. Id. at 1042. 
 84. Id. at 1052.  The Ohio Supreme Court recognized hospital liability for the actions of 
independent-contractor physicians, but expressed a limited test for liability that excluded Sharon 
Albain from recovery.  Id. at 1042-52.  See supra text accompanying note 74, explaining the test. 
 85. Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994). 
 86. Id. at 53.  Syllabus by the court:  
A hospital may be held liable under the doctrine of agency by estoppel for the negligence 
of independent medical practitioners practicing in the hospital when: (1) it holds itself 
out to the public as a provider of medical services; and (2) in the absence of notice or 
knowledge to the contrary, the patient looks to the hospital, as opposed to the individual 
practitioner, to provide competent medical care.   
Id. at 46.  The Syllabus in Ohio is the controlling law within the state.  OHIO SUP. CT. R. REP. OPS. 
1(B)(1), 1(B)(2). 
 87. Southview, 628 N.E.2d at 47.  Mrs. Clark had told her daughter, Kimberly, that if she were 
ever in trouble she should go to Southview Hospital because they advertised that they had hospital 
doctors present twenty-four hours a day.  Id.  Kimberly arrived at the hospital at approximately 6:00 
a.m., with her 18-month-old child, and was dead by 11:16 a.m.  Id.  Dr. Mucci was the emergency 
room doctor on duty the morning that Kimberly died.  Id. 
 88. Id. at 47. Dr. Mucci was president and sole owner of the corporate entity, TMES, and had 
entered into an independent contractor relationship with Southview on behalf of TMES.  Id. 
 89. Id.  TMES had an agreement with Southview that TMES would provide qualified 
physicians to staff the emergency department at Southview twenty-four hours a day and that TMES 
would be an independent contractor for Southview Hospital.  Id. 
14
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Hospital, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.90  The 
court of appeals reversed, holding that “reasonable minds could not 
conclude from the evidence that Dr. Mucci or TMES was an apparent 
agent of Southview.”91  The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of 
appeals’ decision, reinstating the jury verdict, and holding that 
Southview Hospital was estopped from denying that Dr. Mucci was its 
employee.92  The case was permitted to proceed against the hospital 
without including the principal in the suit.93   
The Ohio Supreme Court began its analysis by stating the general 
proposition that “an employer or principal is vicariously liable for the 
torts of its employees or agents under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.”94  It then examined its earlier case, Albain v. Flower Hospital, 
which laid out the foundation and test for the agency by estoppel 
theory.95  The court chose to revisit the decision in Albain because of the 
history of growth in hospital liability and “strong public policy” in favor 
of extending hospital liability.96    
In Southview, the court found that Albain created a form of hospital 
liability that was “illusory,” failing to meet the need for a realistic 
method of holding a hospital liable for the actions of its physicians.97  
The court then found that “liability based on respondeat superior is the 
rule and immunity is the exception.”98 
 
 90. Id. at 47-48.  The jury awarded her $1,004,603.94.  Id.  Judgment was entered for 
$729,603.94 with a $275,000 set-off for the amount received by Clark through her settlement with 
Dr. Mucci and TMES.  Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 54.  The court found that “the record in this case reveals substantial competent 
evidence upon which reasonable minds could conclude, as the jury did, that Southview is estopped 
from denying that Dr. Mucci was its employee,” id., and based on its advertising it held itself out as 
a provider of emergency medical care and that Kimberly looked to the hospital to provide care and 
not to any individual provider.  Id. 
 93. Southview, 628 N.E.2d at 54. 
 94. Id. at 48 (citing Councell v. Douglas, 126 N.E.2d 597, 599-600 (Ohio 1955)). 
 95. Southview, 628 N.E.2d at 48.  See Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990); 
see also supra text accompanying note 74, explaining the test.  The court examined stare decisis 
and determined that it “was not intended to effect a ‘petrifying rigidity,’ but to assure the justice that 
flows from certainty and stability.”  Southview, 628 N.E.2d at 49. 
 96. Southview, 628 N.E.2d at 50. “[T]he public has every right to assume and expect that the 
hospital is the medical provider it purports to be.”  Id. at 53. 
 97. Id. at 48-50. 
 98. Id. at 51 (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)).  Justice Resnik cites the 
first case where the Ohio Supreme Court applied the doctrine of charitable immunity to hospitals, 
Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass’n, 96 N.E. 1089, 1092 (Ohio 1911), stating that “[e]xperience has 
shown that the ends of justice are best secured by holding the master responsible for injuries caused 
by the wrongful acts of his servant, done in the prosecution of his private ends and for his benefit.”  
Southview, 628 N.E.2d at 51.  The court repeated its prediction, made in 1911, that “the rule will be 
15
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The Ohio Supreme Court explained that modern hospitals regularly 
employ a large staff of physicians, nurses, interns, administrative staff, 
and manual workers and they charge patients for their services, even 
collecting by legal action.99  These changes in the fundamental character 
of hospitals were sufficient to justify abolishing the doctrine of 
charitable immunity for hospitals throughout the nation.100  The court 
then held that if a hospital presents itself to the public as a provider of 
medical services, the public has a right to expect that it is the medical 
provider it purports to be, and the hospital should not be able to escape 
liability for the negligent treatment of its patients.101   
Southview was a monumental case in the development of the 
vicarious liability doctrine for medical malpractice law in Ohio.  
Significantly, the Ohio Supreme Court allowed the case to proceed 
against the hospital where the physician’s negligence could be proven, 
but where the physician could not be held liable because the case against 
him had already settled.  The court’s decision in Southview clarified the 
law of hospital liability and allowed plaintiffs to hold a hospital liable 
for the negligent acts of its physicians without requiring that the 
negligent agent or principal be a named defendant in the case. 
2. The Ohio Supreme Court limited hospital liability through 
agency by estoppel. 
The 2005 decision Comer v. Risko102 tempered the effects of 
Southview.  In Comer, an elderly woman went to the hospital on two 
separate occasions for x-rays, and the hospital assigned physicians to 
handle the x-rays on both occasions.103  She later filed a claim for 
medical negligence including failure to timely diagnose and treat 
 
extended to meet the requirements of manifold new conditions brought about by growth and 
advance.”  Id.  The court explained that the ruling was reflective of the time but explains how the 
realities of the role of the hospital in society have changed, undermining the justifications 
underlying charitable immunity.  Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 51-52 (referring to the landmark decision in Bing, 143 N.E.2d 3, which extended 
hospital liability through respondeat superior—abolishing charitable immunity in New York—and 
was quickly followed by other jurisdictions). 
 101. Southview, 628 N.E.2d at 52-54.  The court held that the element of representation was 
satisfied if the hospital held itself out to the public as a provider of medical services and that 
reliance was satisfied if the patient looked to the hospital to receive those services, rather than 
looking to a specific, individual physician.  Id. 
 102. Comer v. Risko, 833 N.E.2d 712 (Ohio 2005). 
 103. Id. at 714.  The x-ray reports failed to mention “the presence of an enlarged mass on the x-
ray films.”  Id.  The large, cancerous mass was not detected until a third x-ray was taken several 
months later.  Id. 
16
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cancer.104  She did not join the independent-contractor physicians 
responsible for reading the x-rays as defendants.105  After the statute of 
limitations applying to the physicians expired, “Knox [Community 
Hospital] moved for summary judgment on the basis that no viable claim 
existed against the hospital because the statute of limitations against [the 
physicians] . . . had expired.”106  The trial court granted the motion and 
the court of appeals reversed, holding that “a plaintiff may pursue a 
claim based upon agency by estoppel against a hospital even if it has not 
named the independent-contractor tortfeasor as a party.”107  The Ohio 
Supreme Court accepted a discretionary appeal, reviewed the matter de 
novo, and held that “there can be no viable claim for agency by estoppel 
if the statute of limitations against the independent-contractor physician 
has expired.”108   
Beginning with an analysis of the history of vicarious liability for 
hospitals in Ohio, the Comer court focused heavily on Albain, which had 
been overruled by Southview.109  It discussed the reasoning in Albain for 
extending liability to hospitals through the doctrine of agency by 
estoppel.110  It then discussed how Southview had overruled Albain in 
favor of a “less stringent test.”111  The court reaffirmed vicarious liability 
for employees through respondeat superior, but attacked the validity of 
liability for the acts of independent contractors.112  The court cited 
several cases that were more than sixty years old, as well as some 
appellate level cases.113  It reasoned that release of the employee 
 
 104. Id. at 713.  Mrs. Clark filed a claim for medical negligence.  Id.  The failure to timely 
diagnose the cancer resulted in Mrs. Clark’s death.  Id.  Carmen Comer, the administrator of Clark’s 
estate, brought the appeal.  Id. at 713.   
 105. Id. at 713-14. 
 106. Id. at 714. 
 107. Id. (quoting Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994)).  
The appellate court relied on Southview to reverse the trial courts holding.  Id. 
 108. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 718 (reversing the appellate court and reinstating the trial court’s 
holding). 
 109. Id. at 714.  Where Southview expanded access hospital liability over what was 
accomplished in Albain, Comer attempted return to the status as laid out in Albain.  Id.   
 110. Id. at 715.  There must be reliance by a third person, based on the appearance of agency, 
that results in harm for agency by estoppel to apply.  Id. 
 111. Id. at 716.  Asserting that Southview justified the new test by the “demands of public 
policy.”  Id.  The new, “less stringent” test set out in Southview required only that the hospital held 
itself out to be a medical provider and that the patient had looked to the hospital to provide medical 
care.  Southview, 628 N.E.2d at 52-54. 
 112. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 716 (explaining that agency by estoppel is a fictional agency 
relationship used to extend liability when there has been reliance on the appearance of agency). 
 113. Id. at 716-17.  The court cites Losito v. Kruse, 24 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1940) and Herron v. 
Youngstown, 24 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio 1940), both more than sixty years old, for the proposition that if 
there is no liability assigned to the agent there can be no liability imposed upon the principal for the 
17
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functioned as a release of the employer.114  The court quoted an 
unreported appellate decision that stated an “employer cannot be found 
to be liable for negligence he did not commit.  The employer’s liability 
is dependent on the negligence of the employee.”115  The court then drew 
the conclusion that releasing an employee from liability would “thwart 
the employer’s ability to seek reimbursement from the employee for 
payments made to the plaintiff by destroying the employer’s subrogation 
rights.”116  In analyzing the application of this doctrine, the court held 
that agency by estoppel is a derivative claim of vicarious liability and 
that liability must flow through the independent-contractor physician to 
the hospital, essentially undermining the court’s previous decision in 
Southview.117   
In his dissent, Justice Pfeifer sharply criticized the decision, 
asserting that the majority stretched unpersuasive precedent in order to 
undermine Southview.118  The dissent stated that “[t]he success or failure 
of such a cause of action is dependent on the negligence of the medical 
provider at issue, but is not dependent on whether the provider is part of 
the lawsuit.”119  It noted specifically that the negligent doctor at issue in 
Southview was not a part of the lawsuit and yet the negligence claim 
proceeded against the hospital as an agency by estoppel claim.120  The 
 
agent’s actions.  Id.  It then cites several lower court opinions that had been decided since Southview 
that had held that a release of an employee resulted in release of an employer.  These cases were 
Radcliffe v. Mercy Hospital Anderson, Nos. C-960424, C-960425, 1997 WL 249436 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1st. Dist. May 14, 1997), Dickerson v. Yetsko, No. 77636, 2000 WL 1739298 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th 
Dist. Nov. 22, 2000), and Wells v. Spirit Fabricating, Ltd., 680 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th 
Dist. 1996).  Id.  Two out of three of these cases were not reported.   
 114. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 717. 
 115. Id. (citing Wells, 680 N.E.2d at 1046).  The plain language of this quote indicates that the 
medical provider must have actually been negligent in order for the employer (hospital) to be liable, 
but does not suggest that actual liability must be imposed on the employee (physician) in order for 
the employer to be liable.  Id.   
 116. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 717.  However, the subrogation rights of the principal against the 
agent are not extinguished even if the claim is barred against the agent if the agent has not been 
released.  See Indiana Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 846 N.E.2d 73, 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2005) (“an 
implied right to indemnification arises . . . within the context of a relationship wherein one party is 
found to be vicariously liable for the acts of a tortfeasor.”); Staffilino Chevrolet, Inc. v Balk, 813 
N.E.2d 940 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 2004) (“an employee impliedly agrees to indemnify his 
employer against loss.”). 
 117. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 718. 
 118. Id. at 718-20 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s citing . . . is less convincing in this 
context.  Even if those cases were persuasive, they address an issue not at play in this case.”).   
 119. Id. (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. at 718. 
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dissent also noted the well-settled law121 that a plaintiff need not sue 
both the primarily and secondarily liable parties in a respondeat superior 
case.122  The dissent disputed the idea that all parties must be included in 
the lawsuit, noting that it cut directly against the Civil Rules of 
Procedure, which permit a defendant to bring in other defendants to 
protect a subrogation claim.123  In fact, the dissent explicitly stated that a 
party’s failure to sue an agent prior to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations does not destroy the hospital’s right of indemnity against 
them, but that such a claim of indemnity arises upon payment of the 
claim.124 
The dissent concluded that the extension of vicarious liability to 
situations where the agent is not a named defendant would not create a 
doctrine of strict liability for hospitals, but that when a hospital holds 
itself out as a provider of services as an institution, it is appropriate to 
subject it to liability.125   
 
 121. Losito v. Kruse, 24 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1940), was decided in 1940 and has been the law in 
Ohio, and has been cited for this proposition, since that time.  Losito, acknowledges that a plaintiff 
need not sue all parties, but may choose whom to include in the claim.  Id. at 708.   
 122. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 719 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (citing Losito, 24 N.E.2d at 707, the 
same case that the majority cited, “[f]or the wrong of a servant acting within the scope of his 
authority, the plaintiff has a right of action against either the master or the servant, or against both, 
in separate actions, as the judgment against one is no bar to an action or judgment against the other 
until one judgment is satisfied”).  The idea that the plaintiff has a right of recovery against either the 
agent or principal individual or both together is a well-settled part of the law of vicarious liability in 
Ohio.  The notion that you must sue the agent in order to sue the principal cuts directly against this 
law, set out in Losito, which has never been directly overturned, but has been cited with approval by 
each subsequent court who has addressed the issue.  E.g., id. at 716-18 (majority opinion). 
 123. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 719 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) 
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party 
plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to 
the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against 
him.   
Id.  (quoting CIV. R. 14 (A)).   
 124. Id. at 719 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  See also Md. Cas. Co. v. Frederick Co., 53 N.E.2d 795 
(Ohio 1944) (paragraph two of the syllabus) (“where judgment in a tort action is had against a party 
only secondarily or vicariously liable for the violation of a common duty owed by two persons, 
upon the payment of such judgment and necessary expenses by such party, there arises an implied 
contract of indemnity in favor of the person (or persons) primarily liable”).  
 125. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 720 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  The fact that an agent has been 
dismissed or has not been sued in the first place does not change the analysis or the hospital’s 
responsibility for the negligence.  Id. 
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3. The common law of vicarious liability continued to develop 
prior to the Wuerth case. 
Ohio courts continued to explore and refine the doctrines as laid out 
in Southview and Comer.  In 2007, the Eighth District Court of Appeals 
explained that the Comer decision applied to physicians who served as 
independent contractors but did not shield the hospital from liability for 
those agents for whom the hospital had direct control, such as nurses.126  
In Doros v. Marymount Hospital, the plaintiff had sued Marymount 
Hospital and John/Jane Doe, as agent of the hospital.127  The statute of 
limitations had already expired when she moved the court to substitute a 
nurse for John Doe.128  The hospital then moved for summary judgment 
based on Comer, and the trial court granted summary judgment.129  On 
appeal, the Eighth District refused to apply Comer, which involved 
respondeat superior rather than agency by estoppel, holding that the trial 
court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the hospital.130   
The Ohio courts have also debated the limitations of the Comer 
ruling in cases other than medical malpractice.  Following Doros, in 
2007, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals addressed the issue in 
Orebaugh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.131  In Orebaugh, the plaintiff alleged 
that she was injured through the negligence of a Wal-Mart employee.132  
She filed a respondeat superior claim against Wal-Mart and the 
 
 126. Doros v. Marymount Hosp., Inc., 2007-Ohio-1140, ¶ 20 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist.). 
“Nurses are subject to the control of the hospital, they are not free to choose their patients, and 
patients are not free to choose their nurses.  In addition, nurses must adhere to hospital guidelines, 
may be hired or fired at the hospital’s discretion, and are under the direct supervision of hospital 
administration.”  Id.  
 127. Id. ¶ 4. 
 128. Id. ¶ 6-8.  The trial court had granted the plaintiff leave to file the amended complaint 
substituting Nurse Madej for John Doe, but Nurse Madej filed a demand for dismissal, claiming the 
statute of limitations had run.  Id.  The court granted the motion.  Id. 
 129. Id. ¶ 7-10.  The court held that “Marymount could not be held vicariously liable for Nurse 
Madej’s actions when Van Doros failed to assert a timely claim against him.”  Id. 
 130. Id. ¶ 22.  The doctrine of agency by estoppel provides liability for the actions of an 
independent contractor while respondeat superior provides liability for the actions of an employee 
for whom the employer has direct control.  In Doros, the negligent party was a nurse rather than a 
physician.  Although Comer did not provide hospital liability for the actions of a physician for 
whom the statute of limitations had run, the Eighth District Court of Appeals found that respondeat 
superior was a separate doctrine that was not affected by the Comer decision, and was the 
appropriate doctrine to apply to a situation involving a negligent nurse.  Id. 
 131. Orebaugh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2007-Ohio-4969 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist.).  
Interpreting Comer, the court of appeals rejected the notion that Comer changed the law of 
respondeat superior.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 132. Id. ¶ 2.  As a Wal-Mart employee was attempting to help Orebaugh load a television, the 
employee dropped the television and caused serious injuries to Orebaugh’s right arm, shoulder, 
neck, and back.  Id. 
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employee as Jane Doe.133  The claim was never amended to include the 
name of the employee.134  After the statute of limitations expired for the 
specific employee, Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment based on 
Comer.135  The trial court granted the motion and the plaintiff 
appealed.136 
The court of appeals refused to extend Comer.137  It explained that 
the foundation for the theory of respondeat superior developed under the 
maxim “qui facit per alium facit per se,” which has been interpreted by 
the Ohio Supreme Court to mean “[t]he act of the servant, done within 
the scope and in the exercise of his employment, is in law the act of the 
master himself.”138  The court explained that this rule is rooted and 
founded firmly in public policy.139 
The Orebaugh court followed the traditional rule in Ohio under the 
principle of respondeat superior and stated that the plaintiff could 
choose to pursue an action against the agent, the principle, or both.140  
The court noted that “[t]here is no requirement that the employee be 
named as a party to the suit in order to prove his negligent acts.”141   
The court then discussed the effect of Comer on the doctrine of 
respondeat superior.142  The court distinguished the application of 
agency by estoppel from respondeat superior, then declared that 
extending Comer to other agency relationships “would overturn the 
extensive case law in Ohio on the issue of respondeat superior, master-
servant liability, and agency liability in general” and would actually 
“overturn cases cited by Comer itself.”143  Orebaugh illustrated the 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  Orebaugh learned the employee’s name through discovery but never amended the 
complaint.  Id.  She voluntarily dismissed the claim and refiled within the savings period, but never 
added the employee as a named defendant.  Id. ¶ 3. 
 135. Id.   
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. ¶ 17 (asserting that Comer does not apply to cases involving respondeat superior 
(direct employment rather than an independent contractor relationship)).  
 138. Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added) (“This rule has been recognized as ‘legal unity of the principal 
and agent.’”) (quoting Atl. & Great W. Ry. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio St. 162, 168 (1869)). 
 139. Id. (the rule is based on “[t]he just responsibilities of persons or corporations acting 
through agents, and the needs of society”).  
 140. Id. ¶ 8 (holding an injured party may pursue damages against the employer of an agent 
acting within the scope of his employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior). 
 141. Id. (quoting Billings v. Falkenburg, No. L-86-017, 1986 WL 9582, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 
6th Dist. Sept. 5, 1986) (internal citations omitted)).  The Orebaugh court found that Comer does 
not apply to liability under the theory of respondeat superior.  Id. ¶ 22. 
 142. See id. ¶¶ 8-22. 
 143. Id. ¶ 21.  The Twelfth District Court of Appeals rejected the idea that the Ohio Supreme 
Court in Comer had intended to overturn precedent, stating: “[h]ad the Ohio Supreme Court 
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narrowness of the Comer holding and explained that the Comer court 
“stated explicitly that its holding was limited to the narrow issue before 
it.”144   
Even the Ohio Supreme Court continued to explore Comer’s 
applicability in different settings.  Later in 2007, the court addressed the 
issue again in Harris v. Mount Sinai Medical Center.145  While Comer 
precluded the application of agency by estoppel where the agent’s 
liability had been extinguished by law through the expiration of the 
statute of limitations, the court held that failure to join a negligent party 
does not render the doctrine of agency by estoppel inapplicable.146  In 
Harris, the plaintiff made a claim against the medical center and alleged 
the negligence of the agents and employees of Mt. Sinai Hospital.147  
Although the case could not proceed against the hospital based on the 
negligence of the independent-contractor physician who had not been 
added as a party, the nurses, who were also not named parties to the suit, 
provided a basis for the case against the hospital under the theory of 
vicarious liability.148  This clarified the court’s previous decision in 
Comer, suggesting that a negligent agent need not be added as a party 
for a claim of vicarious liability to go forward against the principal. 
Other courts continued to discuss the issue.  The Third District 
Court of Appeals addressed the issue in Holland v. Bob Evans149 and 
cited the treatment by both the Eighth and Twelfth Districts in Doros 
and Orebaugh, as well as the Ohio Supreme Court’s more recent 
treatment of the issue in Harris.150  The Holland court held that although 
the plaintiff failed to timely amend his complaint to name the agent 
 
intended to upset this well-settled area of the law, we believe it would have acknowledged the 
effects of its holding in Comer.”  Id. 
 144. Id. ¶ 21.  The court stated that the narrow issue in Comer was whether “a viable claim 
exists against a hospital under a theory of agency by estoppel for the negligence of an independent-
contractor physician when the physician cannot be made a party because the statute of limitations 
has expired.”  Id. (quoting Comer v. Risko, 833 N.E.2d 712, 713 (Ohio 2005)).    
 145. 876 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2007).  The court noted that the doctrine could also apply to the 
negligent acts of nurses who were not named in the suit.  Id. at 1209.  The nurses would subject the 
hospital to liability through respondeat superior rather than agency by estoppel.  Id. 
 146. Id. at 1209. 
 147. Id. at 1203.  The hospital argued that the trial court should have precluded evidence of the 
negligence of the anesthesiologist because he had not been joined as a party.  Id. at 1208. 
 148. Id. at 1209.  This decision demonstrates the intention of the Ohio Supreme Court to limit 
the decision in Comer to agency by estoppel and independent contractors.  
 149. Holland v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 2008-Ohio-1487 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. March 31, 
2008) (a timely filed respondeat superior claim was allowed to go forward against the principal 
when the claim against the agent (waiter) was barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations). 
 150. Id. ¶¶ 5-9.  Although this case does not deal with medical malpractice, it illustrates the 
nature of the law in Ohio and the state of the doctrine of respondeat superior prior to Wuerth.   
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(waiter), the claim against the principal (Bob Evans) was a separate and 
timely filed claim and would be allowed to proceed.151  The court 
interpreted the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Harris to reaffirm the 
traditional doctrine of respondeat superior, holding that the negligence 
of an agent could be the basis of a vicarious liability claim against the 
principal whether or not the agent was a named party in the suit.152 
Until 2009, the liability of a hospital could be asserted in three 
ways:  respondeat superior (a hospital is liable for the negligent acts of 
its employees), agency by estoppel (a hospital is liable for the negligence 
of independent medical practitioners), and direct liability for its own 
negligent conduct.153  The Ohio Supreme Court held that hospitals 
should “shoulder the responsibilities borne by everyone else. . . . The test 
should be . . . as it is for every other employer, was the person who 
committed the negligent injury-producing act one of its employees and, 
if he was, was he acting within the scope of his employment.”154   
III.  WUERTH:  THE TURNING POINT 
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburg, PA. v. Wuerth 
discussed principal liability within the context of legal malpractice.155  
Nationwide Insurance Co. hired McLarens Toplis, a claims adjusting 
company, to assess property damage for its insured, and McLarens hired 
Larry Wood to perform the work.156  Nationwide then fired McLarens 
and Wood, claiming that Wood’s improper appraisals had damaged 
 
 151. Id. ¶10.  The court of appeals referred to Harris and noted “the Supreme Court allowed a 
claim of negligence against the hospital when the negligence of its employees could be the basis of 
the claim even though the nurses were not named as defendants.”  Id. ¶ 9. 
 152. See id. ¶¶ 9-10.   
 153. McGill v. Newark Surgery Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio C.P. Licking Cnty. 2001) (holding 
that the expectations held by the community helped to shape the liability of the hospital). 
 154. Klema v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp. of Youngstown, 166 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1960) 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)).  This case was an 
action for wrongful death based on the negligence of a hospital staff anesthetist.  Id. at 766.  The 
Ohio Supreme Court held that the hospital was liable for the negligent acts of its employee.  Id. at 
771. 
 155. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, PA. v. Wuerth (Wuerth II), 913 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 
2009). 
 156. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, PA. v. Wuerth (Wuerth I), 540 F. Supp. 2d 900, 
902-03 (S.D. Ohio 2007).  Nationwide Insurance Co. entered into a contractual agreement with 
National Catastrophe Adjusters (NCA) in which NCA agreed to provide claims adjusting services to 
Nationwide and its subsidiaries.  Id. at 903.  Nationwide provided property damage insurance to 
Professional Hospitality Resources for six hotels, operated in Virginia Beach, which were damaged 
during the August 28, 1998 hurricane known as Bonnie.  Id.  Nationwide received notice of 
potential claims and contacted NCA for assistance with the claims.  Id.  NCA hired McLarens to 
assist with the adjusting and they retained Larry Wood.  Id.  
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Nationwide.157  McLarens had a professional liability policy with 
National Union, who hired the law firm, Lane Alton, to defend 
McLarens and Wood.158  Richard Wuerth, an attorney for Lane Alton, 
assumed responsibility for the case and handled it almost exclusively 
himself.159  Nationwide won the case against McLarens and Wood, and 
National Union attempted to recover the amount paid out in the 
settlement by filing a malpractice lawsuit against Lane Alton and 
Richard Wuerth.160  National Union asserted legal malpractice claims 
against Richard Wuerth and against Lane Alton, claiming that the law 
firm was both directly liable for its own “wrongful acts, errors, and/or 
omissions,” and vicariously liable for the actions of Richard Wuerth.161 
National Union moved for summary judgment on the issue of 
liability, and the defendants moved for summary judgment on multiple 
grounds, including the statute of limitations.162  The court addressed the 
claims against Wuerth before turning to the claims against Lane 
Alton.163  The court performed an extensive analysis of the relevant 
events and the time of termination and determined that the statute of 
 
 157. Id.  After on 11 days on the job, Nationwide alleged that Mr. Wood had exceeded his 
authority and was negligent in adjusting the claims and Mr. Wood was removed from the job.  Id.  
Nationwide claimed the Mr. Wood was responsible for a commitment of $16 million more than it 
otherwise would have been obligated for if the claims had been properly adjusted.  Id.  Nationwide 
initiated a suit against NCA, McLarens, and Mr. Wood to reclaim the $16 million that it overpaid.  
Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 903.  The trial began on February 4, 2002.  Id.  Wuerth advised several of the 
partners as well as the court that he was feeling ill early in the second week of trial, but continued to 
represent National.  Id.  On February 14, 2002, Wuerth suffered from tremors and was rushed to the 
hospital.  Id.  He was later examined by his family physician and advised not to return to work.  Id.  
He complied, producing an affidavit from his physician declaring that he was physically incapable 
of continuing with the trial.  Id.  The defendants moved for a mistrial based on Wuerth’s incapacity 
but were refused.  Id. at 903-04. 
 160. Id. at 903.  The jury decision was reached on February 21, 2002.  Pursuant to a “High-
Low” settlement agreement, National Union was directed to pay Nationwide $8.25 million.  Id.  
National was reimbursed for the settlement by its reinsurers for $1,625,000.  Id.  National filed the 
action against Wuerth and Lane Alton on February 21, 2003.  Id. 
 161. Id. at 904.  The case was filed in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio. 
 162. Id. at 904-05. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: 
“(1) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the malpractice statute of limitations; (2) Plaintiff is unable to 
show a causal connection between the alleged malpractice and the resulting damage; (3) Plaintiff 
lacks standing to sue; and (4) Defendant Lane Alton is a non-lawyer and therefore cannot be 
directly sued for malpractice and is not vicariously liable because Defendant Wuerth and other Lane 
Alton attorneys are not liable.” Id. 
 163. See id. at 905.  The two relevant claims are that Plaintiffs’ claims against Wuerth are 
barred by the malpractice statute of limitations, and that the defendant, Lane Alton, is a non-lawyer 
who cannot be directly sued for malpractice and is not vicariously liable because Defendant Wuerth 
and other Lane Alton attorneys are not liable.  Id. at 905-10.   
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limitations had run with regard to Defendant Richard Wuerth, granting 
summary judgment in his favor and dismissing him from the case.164  
Following this analysis, the court addressed the plaintiff’s vicarious 
liability claim against the remaining defendant, Lane Alton.  Relying on 
Ohio law requiring liability of an agent in order to establish liability of a 
principal, the court held that Lane Alton could not be held liable for 
Defendant Wuerth’s alleged malpractice because the case against 
Wuerth was barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations.165  
The district court then addressed National Union’s claim of direct 
liability against Lane Alton.  The court defined malpractice as 
“professional conduct by members of the medical professions and 
attorneys,”166 and explained that because Lane Alton was not an 
attorney, but a limited liability company, and an attorney-client 
relationship could never exist, there was no direct liability.167  The court 
 
 164. See id. at 906-11 (citing Smith v. Conley, 846 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio 2006)).  The court 
explained that the claim begins to accrue when “(1) a cognizable event occurred such that the client 
should have known he or she may have an injury caused by his or her attorney; and (2) when the 
attorney-client relationship terminated.”  Wuerth I, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 906.  The court then analyzed 
the facts in the case under each contingency.  Id. at 906-11.  The court listed several specific 
instances where the plaintiffs indicated in their depositions that they thought Wuerth had acted with 
negligence early as February 11, 2002.  Id.  The court also discussed deposition testimony 
indicating that National intended to sue Wuerth and Lane Alton even before settlement discussions 
ensued or the jury verdict was rendered on February 21, 2002.  Id.  The court concluded that the 
relevant event occurred prior to February 21, 2002.  Id. at 911.  The court then went on to analyze 
time of termination of the attorney-client relationship.  Id. at 911-12.  Because it is undisputed that 
Wuerth was unable to work after the 14th, and although Wuerth never formally ended the 
relationship, there is clear evidence that National knew that he had been removed from the case and 
would provide no further assistance on the Nationwide case.  Id. at  910-12.  In fact, on February 20, 
2002, the Nationwide court took judicial notice of the fact for the record that Mr. Rick Marsh was 
being substituted for Mr. Richard Wuerth.  Id.  The court concluded that the termination of the 
relationship occurred prior to February 21, 2002 and therefore the claim against Richard Wuerth 
was barred by Ohio’s one-year statute of limitations with regard to malpractice cases.  Id. at 910-11.  
Lane Alton continued to serve National Union however, and the claim against them was filed within 
the statutory period.  Id. at 912-14.   
 165. Id. at 912-14 (citing Soltis v. Wegman, Hessler, Vanderburg & O’Toole, No. 69602, 1997 
WL 64049, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Feb. 13, 1997).  Soltis held that “absent negligence on the 
party of the [defendant lawyer] as an employee, the law firm and its principals as the employer 
cannot be held liable.”  1997 WL 64069 at *3.  The district court did not decide the issue of whether 
vicarious liability could apply without a liable defendant because the plaintiffs had not argued it, but 
instead the plaintiffs claimed that the “derivative claims against Lane Alton are not barred by the 
statute of limitations as the claims asserted against Defendant Wuerth were timely.”  Wuerth I, 540 
F. Supp. 2d at 912.  Because the court found that the claims against Wuerth were barred, it did not 
need to go further in its analysis.  Id.   
 166. Wuerth I, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (quoting Dingus v. Kirwan, No. E-05-082, 2006 WL 
2384070, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. Aug. 18, 2006)).   
 167. Id. at 913.  “Malpractice occurs when a member of the medical profession or attorney fails 
to (1) treat a case professionally; or (2) fulfill a duty implied into the employment law; or (3) 
exercise the degree of skill or care exercised by members of the same profession practicing in the 
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reexamined the possibility of vicarious liability for Lane Alton based on 
the actions of the other attorneys who contributed to the case and found 
that it did not apply because they were not named parties in the suit.168  
The district court granted summary judgment for Lane Alton and 
dismissed the case.169 
National Union appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.170  The court heard oral argument and then determined that 
Ohio law was “unsettled on this issue.”171  Therefore, it certified the 
following question to the Ohio Supreme Court:  “Under Ohio law, can a 
legal malpractice claim be maintained directly against a law firm when 
all of the relevant principals and employees have either been dismissed 
from the lawsuit or were never sued in the first instance?”172   
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed to answer the question.173  The 
court first divided the question into two main issues:  “whether a law 
firm may be directly liable for legal malpractice . . . [and] whether a law 
firm may be held vicariously liable for malpractice when none of its 
principals or employees are liable for malpractice or have been named as 
defendants.”174  
In first addressing the issue of direct liability, the court considered 
National Union’s claim that an attorney-client relationship may exist 
between a law firm and a client, that a firm owes a duty of care to its 
clients, and that breach of the professional duties by the law firm should 
result in a claim for legal malpractice directly against the firm.175  The 
 
same locality.”  Id. at 912-13 (quoting Dingus, 2006 WL 2384070 at *10).  The court went on to 
explain that defendant, Lane Alton, had never taken the bar examination, was not admitted to the 
bar, and could not be subject to professional discipline.  Id. at 913.  The attorney-client relationships 
are with the individual lawyers of the firm and the court found that the firm’s liability derived from 
those relationships and was based solely on vicarious liability.  Id.  
 168. See id. at 913-14.  Analogizing medical and legal malpractice, the court relied on Albain 
and Comer in determining that there was no liability saying, “Mr. Marsh, Mr. Hutson, and Ms. 
Lashuk cannot be liable because they have never been sued and it is too late to sue them now.”  Id. 
at 914. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 349 Fed. Appx. 983 (6th Cir. 
2009).  The court did not set forth the facts of the case, but referred to the facts set out in the district 
court case. 
 171. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth (Wuerth II), 913 N.E.2d 939, 941 
(Ohio 2009). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 893 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio 2008) 
(granting certiorari). 
 174. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 942.  In addressing two separate questions, the Ohio Supreme 
Court analyzed both vicarious liability and direct liability, that is, “[w]hether a law firm, as an 
entity, can commit legal malpractice.”  Id. 
 175. Id. at 941-44. 
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court examined the similarities between the legal and medical fields 
regarding malpractice, explaining that both lawyers and physicians, by 
the nature of their fields, are often unable to fulfill expectations.176  The 
court then concluded that they should have similar standards for 
determining when a cause of action should accrue in order to afford 
them similar protections from burdensome litigation.177  The court 
focused on medical malpractice, explaining that only individuals could 
practice medicine and therefore, only individuals could be liable for 
medical malpractice.178  The court then examined the nature of the 
 
 176. Id. at 942 (citing Richardson v. Doe, 199 N.E.2d 878, 879-80 (Ohio 1964)).  Richardson 
explained that malpractice was limited to physicians and attorneys and that nurses don’t “practice” 
medicine, but are liable for negligence under traditional negligence law and do not deserve the 
protections that are set out for physicians because “it is the misfortune of both physicians and 
lawyers that, in a very considerable proportion of their cases, they are unable to accomplish the 
purposes desired . . . [and] are peculiarly susceptible to the charge of failure in the performance of 
their professional duties.”  Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 942 (quoting Richardson, 199 N.E.2d at 879-
80).  The Ohio Supreme Court explained that the statute of limitations is lower for malpractice to 
protect lawyers and physicians from overly burdensome litigation.  Id.  See also Richardson, which 
attempted to extend hospital liability by declining to extend the protection afforded to the doctors 
(the reduced statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases) to the nurses, thereby providing that 
the malpractice case could go forward against the hospital if it depended on the nurses rather than 
the physician.  199 N.E.2d at 880-81. 
 177. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 942-43.  The Court in Wuerth II uses the analogy set out in 
Richardson to accomplish the opposite goal, preventing negligence actions against a principal, 
rather than providing a way to extend liability against the principal responsible for a negligent actor.  
Id. at 942.   
 178. Id. The court relied on several cases to support this proposition.  However, the cases they 
relied upon do not clearly stand for the proposition that a hospital or law firm can never be directly 
liable for malpractice.  Instead the cases, based in medical malpractice, sought to expand or apply 
vicarious liability to hospitals by refusing to apply the limitations that the malpractice statute of 
limitations placed on doctors’ liability to other professionals.  Id.  Browing v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993, 
1003 (Ohio 1993), explains that only physicians and attorneys can commit malpractice, not other 
professionals such as engineers or nurses.  Lombard v. Good Samaritan, 433 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio 
1982), holds that the one year statute of limitations does not apply to hospital employees such as 
nurses and technicians.  The case explained that “[t]here is no compelling reason for a nurse to be 
given the protection of a one-year statute of limitations. . . . Therefore, R.C. 2305.11 (A) [the statute 
defining the statute of limitations for medical malpractice] may not bar an action against the 
hospitals who are their employers.”  Id. at 163 (internal quotations omitted).  Propst v. Health 
Maintenance Plan, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 1142 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990), examined a claim against 
Community Mutual Insurance Company and Health Maintenance Plan, two HMOs, and held that 
they could not be liable for the physicians’ alleged medical negligence.  The companies were 
authorized health maintenance organizations, essentially insurers, and did not practice medicine.  Id. 
at 1143.  The case was decided on vicarious liability standards and does not support a finding 
against direct liability for hospitals.  Id. 
  The support cited by the Ohio Supreme Court to determine that “it is a well-established 
common law of Ohio that malpractice is limited to the negligence of physicians and attorneys,” and 
cannot be filed directly against a law firm, Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 943 (quoting Thompson v. 
Cmty. Mental Health Ctrs. of Warren, 642 N.E.2d 1102 (Ohio 1994)), is very weak and subject to 
challenge at some point.  Hignite v. Glick, Layman & Assoc’s., Inc., 2011-Ohio-1698 (Ohio Ct. 
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practice of law, explaining that Supreme Court Rules for the 
Government of the Bar of Ohio set forth “requirements that only 
individuals may satisfy” in order to be admitted to the practice of law.179  
The court then drew a direct analogy between the practice of medicine 
and law, stating:  “in conformity with our decision concerning the 
practice of medicine, we hold that a law firm does not engage in the 
practice of law and therefore cannot directly commit legal 
malpractice.”180 
The Ohio Supreme Court then addressed the second issue:  
“whether a law firm may be held vicariously liable for malpractice when 
none of its principals or employees are liable for malpractice or have 
been named as defendants.”181  In answering this question, the court first 
discussed the doctrine of respondeat superior:  “[g]enerally an employer 
or principal is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees or 
agents,”182 and “[f]or the wrong of a servant acting within the scope of 
 
App. 8th Dist.), is a medical malpractice case that was decided on summary judgment based on 
Wuerth.  Hignite appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio challenging the validity of the 
determination that a law firm, and by analogy a medical facility or hospital, cannot be directly liable 
for the negligence of its practitioners.  See Hignite v. Glick, Layman & Assoc’s, Inc., No. 2011-
0878 (Ohio filed May 23, 2011).  The Ohio Supreme Court again denied jurisdiction.  Hignite v. 
Glick, Layman & Assoc’s, Inc., 2011-Ohio-4751 (Ohio 2011).  This demonstrates the breath of 
issues in the Wuerth decision that require clarification.  However, this paper deals specifically with 
the court’s treatment of vicarious liability in Wuerth and the ramifications of possible interpretations 
of that decision and leaves discussion of the court’s ruling that there can never be direct liability 
against a law firm for another article.   
 179. The court referred to the Ohio Constitution, which grants jurisdiction to the court 
regarding the admission to the practice of law and the “discipline of persons so admitted.”  Wuerth 
II, 913 N.E.2d at 943 (emphasis omitted) (quoting OHIO CONST. art. IV, §2(B)(1)(g)).  Some of the 
rules set forth in the Gov. Bar. R. I referred to by the court include “earning the requisite degrees, 
possessing the requisite character and fitness, passing the bar exam, and taking the oath of office.”  
Id.  The court stated that a “[l]aw firm includes a legal professional association, corporation, legal 
clinic, limited liability company, registered partnership, or any other organization under which a 
lawyer may engage in the practice of law.”  Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Code of Professional 
Responsibility, Definitions (2) (superseded by the Rules of Professional Conduct in Ohio in 
February of 2007 and includes a new definition of firm: “‘Firm’ or ‘law firm’ denotes a lawyer or 
lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship, or other association 
authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a private or public legal aid or public defender 
organization, a legal services organization, or the legal department of a corporation or other 
organization,” Ohio Rules Of Professional Conduct, R.1(c), Effective Feb. 1, 2007 (emphasis 
added))). 
 180. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 943. 
 181. Id. at 942 (emphasis omitted).  
 182. Id. at 943 (quoting Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 51 
(Ohio 1994)).  “This doctrine of liability depends on the control by a principal (or master) over an 
agent (or servant).”  Id. at 944.   
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his authority, the plaintiff has a right of action against either the master 
or the servant, or against both, in separate actions.”183   
The court correctly elucidated the state of existing Ohio law in a 
neutral fashion before inexplicably shifting its focus from whether the 
liability could be adjudicated to whether the liability could be 
imposed.184  The court explained that although “a party injured by an 
agent may sue the principal, the agent, or both, a principal is vicariously 
liable only when an agent could be held directly liable.”185  The court 
found that if no liability is “assigned to the agent, it logically follows 
that there can be no liability imposed upon the principal for the agent’s 
actions.”186  Referencing the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, the court stated that a “law firm is subject to civil liability for 
injury legally caused to a person by any wrongful act or omission of any 
principal or employee of the firm who was acting in the ordinary course 
of the firm’s business or with actual or apparent authority.”187  The court 
focused on the Restatement’s commentary, emphasizing that it 
“presupposes that a firm principal or employee is liable on one or more 
claims.”188  The court then answered the certified question in the 
negative, holding that “a law firm may be vicariously liable for legal 
 
 183. Id. (citing Losito v. Kruse, 24 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1940)) (discussing the respective 
liabilities of master and servant and stating that “a judgment against one is no bar to an action or 
judgment against the other until one judgment is satisfied”).  The court explained that “a mere 
judgment obtained against the former is not a bar to an action or judgment against the latter.”  Id. 
(citing State ex rel. Flagg v. Bedford, 218 N.E 2d 601 (Ohio 1966)) (stating “[t]his court follows the 
rule that until the injured party receives full satisfaction, he may sue either the servant, who is 
primarily liable, or the master, who is secondarily liable, and a mere judgment obtained against the 
former is not a bar to an action or judgment against the latter”). 
 184. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 944. This shift in focus is critical to the interpretation of 
respondeat superior and has caused tremendous confusion as to the requirements to set forth and 
prove a proper case for vicarious liability. 
 185. Id.  The court then cited several cases in support of this proposition from the early 1900s, 
prior to the development of hospital liability including Bello v. Cleveland, 138 N.E. 526 (Ohio 
1922), and Brown v. Louisburg, 36 S.E. 166 (N.C. 1900). 
 186. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 944 (emphasis omitted) (citing Comer v. Risko, 833 N.E.2d 712 
(Ohio 2005)).  The court then extended this rule to other types of vicarious liability stating 
specifically that “an underlying requirement in actions for negligent supervision and negligent 
training is that the employee is individually liable for a tort or guilty of a claimed wrong against a 
third person, who then seeks recovery against the employer.”  Id. (citing Strock v. Pressnell, 527 
N.E.2d 1235, 1244 (Ohio 1988)).  But, the language indicates that the party must be guilty of a 
wrong against the third party, not personally liable in a court of law. 
 187. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 945 (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58.1 (2000)). 
 188. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58.1 cmt. a 
(2000)). 
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malpractice only when one or more of its principals or associates are 
liable for legal malpractice.”189 
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Moyer, joined by four other 
justices, wrote to address the narrowness of the opinion.190  He found 
that the cases cited by the petitioner, National Union, did not directly 
apply or answer the certified question.191  Moyer examined each of the 
cases cited by National Union in support of its case, demonstrating the 
weakness in each and how each case failed to prove the existence of 
direct law firm liability.192  Moyer emphasized the importance of writing 
separately to “stress the narrowness” of the holding, explaining that the 
“opinion should not be understood to inhibit law-firm liability for acts 
like those alleged by the petitioner.”193  Instead, he clarified that a law 
firm could be held vicariously liable for malpractice and possibly 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. (Moyer, C.J., concurring).  Chief Justice Moyer was joined by Justices Pfeifer, 
DeGenaro (sitting in for Justice Stratton), O’Connor, and Lanzinger in stating that “today we 
answer only the very narrow certified question before us.”  Id.  Wuerth II had two majority opinions 
because 5 out of 7 justices joined each opinion.  Id. at 945, 948.   
 191. Id.  Chief Justice Moyer discussed the weakness of the petitioner’s support, stating: 
In fact, no case cited by the petitioner probes the nature of law firm liability for 
malpractice.  Furthermore, in each case, at least one attorney was sued along with the 
law firm defendant, thereby obscuring the question of whether those courts even 
considered the law firm could be liable for malpractice in the absence of a culpable 
individual attorney. 
Id.   
 192. See id. at 946-48.  The majority of Chief Justice Moyer’s concurrence systematically 
undermines the cases propounded by the law firm, explaining that each of the cases cited in support 
do not actually address the narrow issue before the court.  Some of the cases do not deal with 
malpractice at all as in Biddle v. Warren General Hospital, 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999); some 
don’t address “whether the law firm could be directly liable for malpractice or whether the firm 
could be liable in the absence of an individual attorney’s malpractice” as in Blackwell v. Gorman, 
142 Ohio Misc. 2d 50 (Ohio C.P. Franklin Cnty. 2007), Rosenberg v. Atkins, No. C-930259, 1994 
WL 536568 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. Oct. 5, 1994), and Baker v. Leboeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, 
No. C-1-92-718, 1993 WL 662352 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 1993); in some cases it was impossible to tell 
whether the court was referring to the individual attorneys or the law firm because it referred to all 
defendants collectively as in North Shore Auto Sales, Inc. v. Weston Hurd, Fallon, Paisler & 
Howley, L.L.P., 2006-Ohio-456 (Ohio App. 8th Dist.); and in other cases, it was impossible to 
ascertain whether the liability was direct or vicarious because it was not discussed and several 
named attorneys were parties to the suit, as well as the firm itself, as in Baker, 1993 WL 662352.  
Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 946-48.  The plaintiffs provided weak support for their position and the 
concurrence seems to suggest that the decision of the court was based, at least in large part, on that 
fact and should not be understood to substantially change the current law of vicarious or direct 
liability.  Id. at 947.   
 193. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 947 (Moyer, J., concurring).  “Rather a law firm may be held 
vicariously liable for malpractice as discussed in the majority opinion.”  Id. 
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directly liable for causes of action other than malpractice.194  Four other 
justices concurred with this proposition, making Moyer’s concurrence a 
majority opinion.195 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. Wuerth radically changed the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
The Ohio Supreme Court changed the law regarding vicarious 
liability for legal malpractice when it answered Wuerth’s certified 
question in the negative.  A plaintiff could no longer hold a law firm 
liable without adding the negligent actor as a party defendant.  Although 
Wuerth dealt specifically with legal malpractice, the court made 
particular references to medical malpractice.196  If taken to apply to 
medical malpractice, Wuerth results in a drastic shift in the settled law of 
Ohio.197  That shift imposes unreasonable, or even impossible, burdens 
on a plaintiff to name every possible individual who might have been 
involved in his or her care.  This change could lead to multiple, and 
unnecessary, defendants being sued in an effort to ensure a suit’s 
survival.  With this change, if a plaintiff decides to sue only the 
employer for vicarious liability, the employer need only wait until the 
statute of limitations has expired for the employee and then move for 
summary judgment, relying on Wuerth.198   
 
 194. Id.  Chief Justice Moyer explained that a law firm may be directly liable for a cause of 
action other than malpractice, but the issue was not addressed due to the narrowness of the certified 
question.  Id. 
 195. Id. at 948 (Justices Pfeifer, DeGenaro, O’Connor, and Lanzinger concurring). 
 196. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 942.  See supra note 177.  The analogy between legal and 
medical malpractice was made exclusively in the portion of the opinion dealing with direct liability, 
discussed as a separate issue from vicarious liability.  Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 942.  In the section 
referring to vicarious liability, there were no specific references to medical malpractice, but it has 
been interpreted by some Ohio courts as standing for the proposition that the law of medical and 
legal malpractice are analogous in all respects, and that the Wuerth case applies to medical 
malpractice, effectively limiting the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Id. at 943-45.  See Henry v. 
Mandell-Brown, 2010-Ohio-3832, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist.) (applying Wuerth to medical 
malpractice and finding that if the suit against the agent is barred by the statute of limitations, then 
the suit against the principal is also barred). 
 197. See Haney v. Barringer, 2007-Ohio-7214, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist.) (“It is well-
established in Ohio that ‘[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital is liable for the 
negligent acts of its employees.’”) (internal citation omitted); see also Stevic v. Bio-Medical 
Application of Ohio, 2008-Ohio-33, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist.) (“We also concede that the 
employee may not need to be a named party in the lawsuit against the employer.”). 
 198. This is exactly what has happened in multiple cases since Wuerth was decided.  See, e.g., 
Stanley v. Cmty. Hosp., 2011-Ohio-1290, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist.) (court of appeals examined 
a case where the trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital because the 
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Since the decision in Wuerth, Ohio courts, including the Ohio 
Supreme Court, have struggled to apply it in the medical malpractice 
context.  Courts have interpreted the decision in different ways on the 
issue of whether or not a plaintiff may use the doctrine of respondeat 
superior to hold a hospital liable when the negligent employee is not a 
named defendant.199   
Following Wuerth, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether the 
immunity of an agent deprives the injured party of a medical malpractice 
claim of vicarious liability against the agent’s employer in Sawicki v. 
Lucas County.200  Sawicki dealt with the issue of whether the personal 
immunity of a physician absolved the hospital of liability for the 
negligent acts of the physician.201  The court clarified the existing 
doctrine of respondeat superior, stating that it “operates by imputing to 
the employer the acts of the tortfeasor, not the tortfeasor’s liability.”202  
The court added that its prior holding in Comer—that “a hospital cannot 
be held liable under a derivative claim of vicarious liability when the 
physician cannot be held primarily liable”203—was a narrow holding that 
 
nurses, designated as Jane and John Does, had not been named and the statute of limitations against 
them had run); Hignite v. Glick, Layman & Assoc’s, 2011-Ohio-1698, at *8  (Ohio Ct. App. 8th 
Dist.) (court of appeals affirmed a judgment by the trial court granting summary judgment in favor 
of the dental practice because the plaintiff had not sued any of the dentists individually and the 
dentists could no longer be sued because the statute of limitations on an action against them had run, 
although the action against the practice was timely filed). 
 199. See, e.g., Henry v. Mandell-Brown, 2010-Ohio-3832, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist.) (if a 
suit against the agent is barred by the statute of limitations, then the suit against the principal is also 
barred); Friedman v. Castle Aviation, No. 2:09-cv-749, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 80556, at *7 (S.D. 
Ohio Aug. 9, 2010) (plaintiff need not name an agent as a defendant in order to proceed against the 
principal for the agents negligence); Taylor v. Belmont Cmty. Hosp., 2010-Ohio-3986, at *9 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 7th Dist.) (distinguishing Wuerth and allowing a plaintiff to pursue a respondeat superior 
claim against the hospital without joining the negligent agent); Scott v. McCluskey, No. CV 2009-
07-4941, 2010 WL 4997873 (Ohio C.P. Summit Cnty. Sept. 27, 2010) (holding that the principles 
set forth in Wuerth were not applicable to medical malpractice and “declin[ing] to eviscerate in one 
stroke the concept of vicarious liability that has been in legal existence for hundreds of years”); 
Stanley, 2011-Ohio-1290, at *5 (medical employees need not be named parties to a suit in order to 
sue the hospital-employer).  See also infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text for further 
explanation. 
 200. State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl., 931 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (Ohio 2010).   
 201. Id.  A negligent physician was employed both by the state and by a private entity (Peter N. 
Temesy-Armos, M.D., and Associated Physicians of MCO, Inc.) and the physician was personally 
immune from liability because of his status as a state employee.  Id. at 1085.  The Ohio Supreme 
Court held that his personal immunity did not absolve his private employer for his negligent acts 
committed while in the scope of employment.  Id. at 1093.  The suit was against the doctor’s private 
employer only, and not against the physician as a state employee.  Id. at 1085.   
 202. Id. at 1089 (emphasis added). 
 203. Id. (citing Comer v. Risko, 833 N.E.2d 712 (Ohio 2010)). 
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turned exclusively on the theory of agency by estoppel.204  Although the 
Sawicki decision followed Wuerth, the court did not address whether, or 
how, the Wuerth decision should be applied to medical malpractice or 
medical negligence cases where an alleged individual tortfeasor is not, 
or cannot be, a defendant.   
Sawicki failed to clarify the use of Wuerth in medical malpractice, 
and confusion is still evident throughout Ohio regarding the current law 
for the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Some courts have followed 
Wuerth with regards to both legal malpractice and medical 
malpractice.205  Some Ohio courts, specifically considering medical 
malpractice and negligence, have rejected the theory that the employer 
could not be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior unless the 
agent was also a named party.  Other courts, citing Wuerth as support, 
have come to the opposite conclusion of that stated in Wuerth,206 while 
others have relied on the narrowness of the Wuerth decision and refused 
to extend it to medical malpractice.207 
 
 204. Id.  
 205. See, e.g., Hildebrant v. Provident Bank, 2010-Ohio-2712 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist) 
(holding that when no individual attorneys or employees from the law firms were named as 
defendants in the complaint, no claim for vicarious liability by the law firm existed); see also 
Mandell-Brown, 2010-Ohio-3832 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.).  In Mandell-Brown, the court applied Wuerth 
to medical malpractice in determining that the respondeat superior claim against “Mandell-Brown 
Plastic Surgery Center” was barred because there was no suit filed against the individual physician 
responsible for the negligence, noting that the Ohio Supreme Court in Wuerth acknowledged that 
legal and medical malpractice issues are analogous.  Id. ¶ 14.  The named defendant in the case was 
“The Mandell-Brown Plastic Surgery Center” and not the physician “Mark Mandell-Brown, M.D.”  
Id. ¶ 2.  By the time the plaintiff learned of the deficiency, the statute of limitations had run against 
the physician and the plaintiff could not amend his claim to include a claim against the individual 
physician.  Id. ¶ 3.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mark Mandell-Brown 
Surgery Center because of the failure of the vicarious liability claim due to the inability of the 
plaintiff to add Mark Mandell-Brown to the claim.  Id.  The First District Court of Appeals upheld 
the verdict.  Id. ¶ 14.  Lavar Henry was not able to pursue a claim for restitution for the damage he 
had suffered due to the negligence of Mark Mandell-Brown.  Id.    
 206. Friedman v. Castle Aviation, No. 2:09-cv-749, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 80556, at *7 (S.D. 
Ohio Aug. 9, 2010) (citing Wuerth for the proposition that “Ohio law allows an injured party to sue 
the principal, the agent, or both” and holding that the “[p]laintiff need not name that agent as a 
defendant in order to proceed against [the principal]”). 
 207. See, e.g., Taylor v. Belmont Cmty. Hosp., 2010-Ohio-3986 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist.). The 
court specifically addressed the issue of “whether Wuerth should be extended to the case before us 
and/or whether it would preclude suit against the hospital where the employees were not sued and 
where the statute of limitations ran against them after suit had been filed against the hospital.”  Id. ¶ 
29.  Noting that “Wuerth acknowledged the basic premise that the plaintiff can choose to sue the 
master, the servant, or both,” the court distinguished Wuerth, stating that a partner’s relationship 
with his law firm is not really that of an employer-employee because he is part owner and therefore 
was different from a claim against a hospital for respondeat superior.  Id. ¶ 34 (citation omitted).  
The court specifically refused “to extend a Supreme Court case regarding law firm liability for the 
acts of partners and associates to the arena of hospital liability for the acts of its employees.”  Id. ¶ 
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The Sixth District Court of Appeals has before it a case that 
illustrates the drastic change in Ohio law created by Wuerth.208  The 
plaintiff in this case claimed that “Toledo Hospital provided negligent 
care through physicians and other medical personnel acting within the 
scope and course of their employment.”209  The case was originally filed 
in 2003, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Toledo Hospital in 
2007.210  The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed in December 
2008 and remanded for a new trial.211 
While the case was awaiting a new trial, Wuerth was decided on 
July 29, 2009.212  On September 30, 2009, Toledo Hospital filed a 
 
35.  The court addressed the narrowness of the holding in Wuerth, noting that a majority of the 
justices signed onto the concurrence in Wuerth, which stressed the narrow holding, making it part of 
the majority decision.  Id.  Justice DeGenaro, in her concurrence, stated that the plaintiff could 
“directly pursue the hospital for their damages under the theory of respondeat superior, without 
joining the employees as party defendants.”  Id. ¶ 47.   
  See also Scott v. McCluskey, No. CV 2009-07-4941 (Ohio C.P. Summit Cnty. Aug. 13, 
2010) (holding that “the principals set forth in Wuerth are not applicable . . . as the negligence of its 
agents and/or employees could be the basis of the claim even though individual nurses or other 
individual employees and/or agents involved in the care of [the plaintiff] were not individually 
named as defendants”). 
  See also Stanley v. Cmty Hosp., 2011-Ohio-1290 (Ohio Ct. App. 2nd Dist.).  The court 
examined the applicability of Wuerth and determined that Wuerth “must be given a narrow 
application.”  Id. at *4.  The court interpreted Wuerth as not precluding a suit against a hospital for 
the negligence of its employee nurses who were not named as defendants.  Id. at *5.  The defendant 
appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.  In its Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction, 
the appellee, Community Hospital, argued that:  
[c]larification is necessary concerning general medical malpractice precedent and 
vicarious liability of hospitals.  There is clearly a split among courts on this issue. . . . 
This case presents a perfect opportunity for this Court to address the documented and 
pervasive confusion before it develops into further inconsistent decisions.  The 
inconsistent decisions which are making it impossible for medical malpractice plaintiffs 
and defendants to predict with any certainty whether liability flows to a hospital where 
its agents or employees are never named as defendants.  
Stanley v. Cmty Hosp., No. 2011-0711, 2011 WL 1786890, at *8-10 (Ohio filed Apr. 29, 2011).  
The supreme court again declined to grant jurisdiction, see Stanley v. Cmty. Hosp., 951 N.E.2d 
1047 (Ohio 2011), however, it is clear that the demand for clarity comes from both plaintiffs and 
defendants and this issue continues to resurface before the Ohio Supreme Court. 
 208. See Tisdale v. Toledo Hosp., No. L-11-1005 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist.) (filed Jan. 10, 
2011). 
 209. Notice of Appeal at 2, Tisdale v. Toledo Hosp., No. L-11-1005 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 
Jan. 10, 2011), CI 03-4247 (Lucas Cnty Ct. Comm. Pl, Notice filed Jan. 10, 2011) (internal quotes 
omitted).  The Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the individual physicians that had been named 
defendants.  Id.  The nurses were not named as defendants.  Id. 
 210. Id. at *1-2.   
 211. Id. at *3.  The court of appeals found that the trial court had abused its discretion in 
denying the plaintiffs’ motion to excuse a juror for cause.  Id.  Toledo Hospital appealed and the 
Ohio Supreme Court denied jurisdiction in April 2009.  Id. 
 212. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 2009). 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/7
12- WESIG MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  10:01 AM 
2012] USING IT FOR ALL IT’S WUERTH 375 
motion to dismiss the case based on Wuerth, claiming that the plaintiffs 
failed to name an employee or agent of the hospital as a party 
defendant.213  The court examined the motion, stating that: 
Plaintiffs [found] themselves in an untenable predicament.  At the time 
their initial suit was filed, it was presumed that a cause of action could 
be maintained against a hospital alone when one or more of its 
employees were alleged to have been negligent in performing duties 
within their scope of employment.  However. . . . [Wuerth] turned that 
presumption on its head.214 
The trial court granted the dismissal, holding that prior to Wuerth, 
“plaintiffs could sue the hospital directly and did not have to name any 
of the hospital employees in order to hold the hospital liable for the 
employees’ negligent acts.  The Wuerth decision change[d] that.”215 
The Ohio Supreme Court was recently provided with the 
opportunity to examine and clarify the doctrine of vicarious liability 
following Wuerth.  This is an important issue of great public and general 
interest that has a substantial effect on the doctrine of medical 
malpractice in Ohio.  In Henry v. Mandell-Brown,216 the plaintiff sued 
only the principal, a corporate surgery center, using the theory of 
respondeat superior.217  The case was timely filed.218  The case was 
dismissed without prejudice, and the plaintiff later attempted to refile, 
including a claim against the physician.219  The claim against the 
principal was preserved under the savings statute, but the claim against 
 
 213. Notice of Appeal at 3, Tisdale, No. L-11-1005.  The statute of limitations had run against 
the nurses several years before.  Id.   
 214. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).  The court explained how the shift in Ohio law created a 
difficult, if not impossible, situation for the plaintiffs.  Id.  This also raises the problem of 
retroactive application of Wuerth. 
 215. Id. at *6.  This court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court in Wuerth analogized to medical 
malpractice and found that the rule set forth in Wuerth applies equally to legal and medical 
malpractice.  Id. at *11.  The plaintiffs made an appropriate claim against the hospital based on the 
well-settled Ohio law of respondeat superior, but because of the confusion created by Wuerth, they 
were denied a right to recover for their injuries.  Id. at *11-12. 
 216. 2010-Ohio-3832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist.).  Dr. Mandell-Brown performed surgery on 
Levar Henry, who then filed a pro se complaint ten months later against the Mandell-Brown Plastic 
Surgery Center alleging medical malpractice and fraud related to surgery.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 217. Id. ¶ 2.  
 218. Id.   
 219. Id.  Henry failed to file the required affidavit of merit and the trial court dismissed the 
complaint without prejudice.  Id.  Henry, represented by counsel, refiled within the savings period.  
Id. ¶ 3.  The new claim specifically named the physician, Dr. Mandell-Brown, and sought to recover 
from The Plastic Surgery Experts (Mandell-Brown Plastic Surgery Center) under a doctrine of 
respondeat superior.  Id. 
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the physician was time barred by the statute of limitations.220  Relying on 
Wuerth, the First District Court of Appeals held that “[the physician] 
cannot be held directly liable for the alleged malpractice because the 
claims against him were not filed within the limitations period.  And, the 
respondeat superior claim against the surgery center could not survive 
the dismissal of the claims against [the physician].”221 
This interpretation of Wuerth completely reverses the settled Ohio 
doctrine that the plaintiff has a right choose who to proceed against—a 
doctrine that was affirmed in Wuerth.222 
The plaintiff in Henry v. Mandell-Brown recently appealed the case 
to the Ohio Supreme Court in Henry v. The Plastic Surgery Experts.223  
However, the court declined to hear the case on February 2, 2011, 
declining the opportunity to clarify how Wuerth should apply to medical 
malpractice.224   
Following this decision, the Ohio Supreme Court was presented 
with another case that raised the issue of the application of Wuerth in the 
medical malpractice context.  In Stanley v. Community Hospital,225 a suit 
was brought against the hospital and against Jane and John Doe as 
nurses and physicians.226  The plaintiff did not amend the complaint, and 
after the statute of limitations had expired against the nurses, the hospital 
moved for summary judgment based on Wuerth, claiming that the 
hospital could not be vicariously liable because the nurses were never 
sued and the statute of limitations had run against them so that they 
could not be sued.227  The trial court granted summary judgment, relying 
on the holding in Wuerth.228  The Second District Court of Appeals 
reversed, distinguishing Wuerth as involving malpractice rather than a 
medical claim, and distinguishing the negligence of nurses as employees 
 
 220. Id. at *1-3.   
 221. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).   
 222. Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ohio 2009) (citing Losito v. Kruse, 24 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 
1940) with approval for the proposition that “the wrong of a servant acting within the scope of his 
authority, the plaintiff has a right of action against either the master or the servant, or against both, 
in separate actions, as a judgment against one is no bar to an action or judgment against the other 
until one judgment is satisfied”). 
 223. Henry v. Plastic Surgery Experts, No. 2010-1861 (Ohio filed Oct. 29, 2010) (Notice of 
Appeal). 
 224. Henry v. Mandell-Brown, 940 N.E.2d 987 (Ohio 2011) (Table), reconsideration denied, 
944 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio 2011). 
 225. 2011-Ohio-1290 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist.). 
 226. Id. ¶ 3. 
 227. Id. ¶ 4. 
 228. Id. ¶ 6.   
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from that of physicians as independent contractors.229  The appellate 
court stated that “[t]he holding in Wuerth must be given a narrow 
application.”230  The court held that “Wuerth does not preclude a suit 
against [the hospital] for the negligence of its employee nurses despite 
the fact that the nurse or nurses were not named as defendants in [the 
plaintiff’s] complaint.”231   
The hospital appealed the case to the Ohio Supreme Court.232  In its 
memorandum in support of jurisdiction, Community Hospital argued “it 
is unclear whether plaintiff’s lawyers are required to sue the actual 
medical providers.”233  The memorandum discusses the split in Ohio 
decisions following Wuerth and claims that “clarification is necessary 
concerning general medical malpractice precedent and vicarious liability 
of hospitals.”234  The Supreme Court of Ohio again denied 
jurisdiction.235  The state of the doctrine of respondeat superior remains 
unsettled in Ohio.   
This recent case, along with the split among lower state courts, 
demonstrates the need for clarification; both plaintiffs and defendants 
are unclear regarding the current status of the law in Ohio concerning 
respondeat superior in the context of medical malpractice. 
B. Other States’ treatments of the issue. 
As discussed above, there is a general movement throughout the 
United States to hold hospitals liable for the negligent acts of their 
doctors, and the courts have continued to act consistently with that 
theory.  Some courts have directly addressed the question at issue 
here.236  In 2007, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the 
 
 229. Id. ¶¶ 20-22.  The court of appeals stated that “physicians and attorneys are not typically 
considered ‘employees’ at their respective business.”  Id.  The court also stated that malpractice is 
limited to the professional misconduct of “members of the medical profession and attorneys” and 
cannot describe the actions or negligence of employees.  Id.  Thus the Second District Court of 
Appeals limited the reach of Wuerth to those who could not be considered employees.  Id.   
 230. Id. ¶ 22. 
 231. Id. ¶ 23. 
 232. Stanley v. Cmty. Hosp., No. 2011-0711 (Ohio filed Apr. 29, 2011).  Community Hospital 
filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction on April 29, 2011.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court of Ohio declined jurisdiction on August 24, 2011.  Stanley v. Cmty. Hosp., 951 
N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 2011). 
 233. Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction at *3, Stanley v. Cmty. Hosp., No. 2011-0711 
(Ohio Apr. 29, 2011), 2011 WL 1786890. 
 234. Id. at *8. 
 235. Stanley v. Cmty. Hosp., 951 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 2011). 
 236. Whether an agent (employee) must be a named defendant in order to proceed against the 
principal (hospital). 
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dismissal of an employee on statute of limitations grounds does not bar 
an action against the employer for the dismissed employee’s negligence 
because it does not amount to an “affirmative finding of non-negligence” 
against the employee.237    
Even those states that do not appear eager to expand hospital 
liability recognize a respondeat superior claim without the requirement 
that the negligent agent be sued.238  South Carolina reluctantly 
recognizes the doctrine of respondeat superior.239  And in the context of 
a hospital, South Carolina recognizes that the plaintiff must prove 
malpractice against the physician, that a physician is the hospital’s agent, 
and that tortious acts generally occur within the scope of that agency 
relationship.240  There is no specific requirement that the plaintiff sue the 
employee in order to sue the employer under a theory of respondeat 
superior.241 
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Tennessee directly addressed the 
issue of whether a hospital may be sued when the claim against the agent 
is barred by operation of law or the agent was never sued.242  The court 
considered Wuerth in its analysis, but did not adopt the holding.243  The 
court cited Wuerth for the proposition that “a plaintiff is free to sue the 
agent, the principal, or both,”244 and explained that, “[e]ven where the 
agent’s conduct is the sole basis for the principal’s liability, the agent 
 
 237. Hughes v. Doe, 639 S.E.2d 302, 304 (Va. 2007).  The court also noted that a plaintiff need 
not file a lawsuit against an employee in order to attack the employer on a theory of respondeat 
superior, explaining that “[n]o judgment against the employee individually is necessary for recovery 
[against an employer on a theory of respondeat superior]; only a finding that the employee was 
negligent.”  Id.  See also Sean P. Byrne & Paul Walkinshaw, Health Care Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 
441-42, 461-62, 462 n.152 (2007). 
 238.  See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 41, at 438-45, 472.  South Carolina is an example 
of a state where the courts have not appeared eager to embrace the movement toward greater 
hospital liability, but this state still is not “immune to the changing tide of perception and . . . 
policy.”  Id.  See, e.g., Shuler v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 437 S.E.2d 128, 129 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) 
(setting out a strict test for agency requiring detrimental reliance); Strickland v. Madden, 448 S.E.2d 
581, 585 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (declining to consider agency because there was no evidence to 
support detrimental reliance).   
 239. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 41, at 438-45. 
 240. Id.  In spite of its reluctance, it does recognize the doctrine of respondeat superior as 
applied to medical malpractice and has no requirement that the negligent agent be a named party in 
the suit.  Id. 
 241. See id. 
 242. Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosp., 325 S.W.3d 98, 105-06 (Tenn. 2010). 
 243. Id. at 105. 
 244. Id. at 105 n.9 (citing Wuerth II, 913 N.E.2d at 944 among several other cases that stand 
for the same proposition). 
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remains a ‘proper, but not a necessary’ party.”245  The court found in 
favor of the plaintiff because, although the claim against the negligent 
physician was extinguished by the operation of law, the vicarious 
liability claim against the hospital was properly filed.  The long-standing 
law of Tennessee regarding vicarious liability is very similar to the 
settled law of Ohio and is persuasive authority that is instructive 
regarding the appropriate interpretation and use of the Wuerth 
decision.246 
C. Where do we go from here? 
The history of Ohio law shows an expansion of hospital liability, 
and an attempt to protect the innocent patient-victim, through the 
development of vicarious liability.  The law regarding respondeat 
superior prior to the Wuerth decision was well-settled regarding the 
ability of a plaintiff to hold a principal liable through vicarious liability 
without adding the agent as a named defendant.247  Even in cases where 
 
 245. Id. at 105 (citation omitted).  The Tennessee Supreme Court analyzed the issue of whether 
a procedural bar of claims against a physician (expiration of the statute of repose) should bar a 
vicarious liability claim against the employer.  Id. at 105-06.  The court explained that when an 
agent is exonerated (not negligent), it is “contradictory and absurd to find the principal guilty on the 
same evidence,” and when a plaintiff fails to timely file a suit against a principal until after a claim 
against the agent is barred by expiration of the statute of repose, the plaintiff is barred from doing an 
“end run” around the statute by later filing a suit against the principal.  Id. at 107-11.  The court 
explains that this exception (inability to sue the principal) is “triggered only when a plaintiff 
belatedly attempts to amend its complaint to add a new vicarious liability claim against the principal 
after its claims against the agent have become barred by operation of law.”  Id. at 111.  The doctrine 
is then clarified, and the question of whether the agent must be an active defendant in the suit is 
answered, when the court states: 
The limitation does not apply in circumstances where the plaintiff has initially filed a 
vicarious liability claim against the principal, and the plaintiff’s claim against the 
principal’s agents are later extinguished by operation of law. . . . In circumstances where 
the plaintiff has properly asserted a vicarious liability claim against the principal, the 
extinguishment of the plaintiff’s claims against the agent, by voluntary dismissal or 
otherwise, “merely produces the same effect as if the agent had never been sued.   
Id. (citation omitted).  The court recognized the plaintiff’s option to sue only the principal in a 
respondeat superior case.  Id.   
 246. Id.  “It has long been recognized in Tennessee that a principal may be held vicariously 
liable for negligent acts of its agent . . . [and] that a plaintiff may sue a principal based on its 
vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of its agents without suing the agent.” 
 247. See, e.g., Krause v. Case W. Reserve Univ., No. 70712, 1996 WL 732537, at *6 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 8th Dist. Dec. 19, 1996).  In this case, the plaintiff had a derivative claim against MetroHealth.  
The court explained the state of the law in Ohio: 
MetroHealth’s liability is strictly based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, i.e., if the 
defendant doctors are not liable, MetroHealth cannot be liable.  Under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, without an underlying tort claim against an employee, a plaintiff 
has no claim against the employee’s employer. . . . Regardless of the fact that the seven 
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the negligent employee had been dismissed, the plaintiff was permitted 
to move forward against the defendant hospital based on a theory of 
respondeat superior.248  Ohio’s appellate courts were generally 
consistent in their interpretations of the prior cases and the state of the 
law at that time.249   
The Ohio courts have demonstrated a clear intention to expand 
hospital liability and to provide protection for patients harmed through 
negligence while in the care of the hospital.250  The Ohio Supreme 
 
doctors were not formally made parties defendant, plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of 
her allegations against them for the purposes of testing the merits of the dismissal against 
MetroHealth. . . . There is no requirement that an employee be named as a party to a suit 
in order to prove his negligent acts.   
Id. (emphasis added).  The court explicitly states that a party need not be a part of a lawsuit for 
liability to be based on his negligence.  Id.  See also Haney v. Barringer, 2007-Ohio-7214, ¶ 46 
(Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist.) (citing Berdyck v. Shinde, 613 N.E.2d 1014 (Ohio 1993) (“It is well-
established in Ohio that [under the doctrine of respondeat superior], a hospital is liable for the 
negligent acts of its employees”)); Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, 2008-Ohio-33, at *3 
(Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist.) (citing Comer v. Risko, 833 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ohio 2005) for the 
proposition that the “employee may not need to be a named party in the lawsuit against the 
employer”). 
 248. See, e.g., Sullins v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 2003-Ohio- 398, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th 
Dist.) (although the plaintiff settled with and dismissed his claim against the doctor, he was 
permitted to “proceed[] against UH on the alleged negligence of Dr. Woolley and the nursing staff,” 
who were never party defendants); Perry v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland, 2004-Ohio-4098, at *10 
(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist.) (the court recognized that the dismissal of the doctors for whom the 
vicarious liability is predicated does not impact the claims against the hospital).  The Perry court 
stated: 
The claims against [University Hospital (UH)] were based on the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, under which the hospital could be held libel for injuries caused by the 
negligence of its employees.  Although Perry was required to prove the negligence of the 
doctors to prevail on her claims against UH, she could do so without the doctors being 
present in the actions.  Indeed, we have previously held that there is no requirement that 
an employee be named as a party in a suit in order to prove his negligent acts. 
Id. 
 249. See, e.g., Sullins, 2003-Ohio-398, at *2 (holding that a claim went forward against the 
principal when the agent had been dismissed); Perry, 2004-Ohio-4098 (holding that employers may 
be held vicariously liable when the employee has been voluntarily dismissed from the case); 
Ferfuson v. Dyer, 777 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2002) (holding that the hospital 
was responsible for the negligence of the nurse, rather than the physician supervising her); Grimm 
v. Summit Cnty. Children Servs. Bd., 2006-Ohio-2411, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist.) (holding the 
hospital vicariously liable for failure to report by the agents who were not named defendants); 
Stevic, 2008-Ohio-33, at *3 (“the employee may not need to be a named party in the lawsuit against 
the employer”); Haney, 2007-Ohio-7214, at *8 (“It is well-established in Ohio that under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital is liable for the negligent acts of its employees”); Ind. 
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 846 N.E.2d 73, 80 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2005) (employer held liable through 
a theory of respondeat superior after the case against the negligent employee was dismissed). 
 250. Grimm, 2006-Ohio-2411, at *6 (holding a hospital liable for the negligence of the nurses 
to report suspected child abuse, upholding an award of $224,000 against the hospital based on a 
vicarious liability claim of respondeat superior where the nurses were not named parties in the suit, 
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Court’s decision in Wuerth has “turned that presumption on its head” 
and disrupted the settled state of the doctrine of respondeat superior 
with regard to hospital liability.251  There is an immediate need for the 
Ohio Supreme Court to clarify the doctrine of respondeat superior and 
the application of Wuerth to medical malpractice cases. 
1. Weaknesses in the argument to extend Wuerth. 
It is not appropriate to extend Wuerth to medical malpractice on the 
reasoning that it will lower insurance and medical costs.  While the new 
interpretation of the law could possibly reduce hospital liability, and 
thereby reduce the cost of hospital insurance, the reality is that medical 
malpractice insurance costs are not a major cost of the health care 
profession, constituting only one half of one percent (0.5%) of the “total 
American health care bill.”252   
The changed doctrine, resulting in barring a substantial number of 
medical malpractice claims against hospitals, could result in relaxed 
quality standards by hospitals and increased injuries.253  The increased 
injuries could result in overall higher healthcare costs.254  
Rather, modern hospitals need “strong financial incentives to 
exercise tight control over physicians’ treatment decisions.”255  Patients, 
 
and demonstrating the general view that hospitals should not escape liability for the negligence of 
their employees). 
 251. Tisdale v. Toledo Hosp., No. CI 03-4247, slip op. at 5 (Ohio C.P. Lucas Cnty. 2010), 
appeal filed, No. L-11-1005 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. Jan. 10, 2011). 
 252. See Braden & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 694.   
Many states have attempted to limit the number of medical malpractice claims filed by 
shortening their respective statutes of limitation. . . . The Ohio legislature expressly 
provided that one purpose behind the tort reform legislation was to reduce medical care 
and insurance-related costs. . . . Tort reform principles were not enacted for the benefit of 
the innocent patient-victim … [but] to lower insurance costs associated with medical 
care.   
Id. at 695. 
 253. Id.  The relaxed standards would be due to the fact that the hospitals would be less likely 
to be held accountable for the actions of their employees.  Id.  According to the 1990 Harvard 
Medical Practice Study to the State of New York, fifty-one percent (51%) of deaths from medical 
injury resulted from negligent treatment.  HARVARD PRACTICE MEDICAL STUDY, PATIENTS, 
DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT 
COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK Ch. 6, at 1-2 (1990).  Although the study is specific to New York, it 
demonstrates the magnitude of the medical negligence problem, and the need for hospital liability in 
an effort to ensure that hospitals take the appropriate measures to protect their patients from 
negligent treatment.  Id.  
 254. Id. 
 255. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the 
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 394 (this article is part of a 
larger study of enterprise liability for medical malpractice).  During the time that the courts 
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who have trusted their lives to the care of a hospital and have been 
injured due to negligence of those who represent the hospital, should be 
able to recover for their injuries.  Increased hospital liability through 
respondeat superior “assures [both] payment of an obligation to the 
person injured and gives warning that justice and the law demand the 
exercise of care.”256  Applied properly, respondeat superior ensures that 
injured people are able to recover if they prove their claim and does not 
allow hospitals to escape liability, merely because of the absence of a 
party from the lawsuit, when negligence is clear. 
Without caution and clarification by its supreme court, Ohio could 
take a step backwards in the advances it has made in protecting patient-
victims harmed by negligence, and in ensuring continued improvements 
in hospital care through deterrence. 
It is also inappropriate to extend Wuerth based on the argument that 
there can be no secondary liability without primary liability.257  It should 
not be the ability to hold a particular employee liable as a defendant that 
creates liability through respondeat superior, but the ability to prove that 
a particular employee acted negligently during the course and scope of 
employment.  The negligent individual need not be present in the suit for 
the hospital to fully litigate the issue of negligence.258 
The doctrine of respondeat superior is based upon the principle of 
extending the responsibility for the negligent acts of an employee to the 
party who has the most to gain through the actions of that employee.259  
As mentioned above, hospitals benefit tremendously through the 
physicians they affiliate with or employ.260  The “malpractice of 
physicians and other health care personnel [remains] a prerequisite to the 
imposition of liability on the hospital.”261  The Ohio Supreme Court 
could eliminate the problem of allowing hospitals to avoid liability 
where they should be held accountable, while at the same time ensuring 
that hospitals are not held liable in situations where the employee was 
 
extended malpractice liability to hospitals, the health care system was developing into a trillion-
dollar industry.  Id. at 381.   
 256. Id. at 386 (internal citation omitted).   
 257. See, e.g., Comer v. Risko, 833 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ohio 2005). 
 258. E.g., Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, 2008-Ohio-33, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th 
Dist.). 
 259. Beth Bates Holiday et al., 39 OHIO JUR. 3D Employment Relations §407 (2011) (the theory 
behind respondeat superior liability is that “the employee’s acts are imputed to the employer 
because the employee, acting within the course and scope of employment, is assumed to do only 
those acts which benefit the employer”).  
 260. Supra Part II.C. 
 261. Abraham & Weiler, supra note 255, at 393. 
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not negligent during the scope of employment, by clarifying Wuerth and 
limiting it to legal malpractice.   
2. Public policy weighs in favor of restricting the Wuerth decision 
to legal malpractice. 
Requiring that a plaintiff must name the agent as a defendant in a 
respondeat superior claim against a hospital is contrary to settled Ohio 
law and goes against the public policy behind extending liability to 
hospitals.262 
When examining negligence within the hospital setting, it is 
difficult to separate the failures of individual physicians from the larger 
environments or systems in which they work.263 
In modern medicine, a patient is a mouse in a maze.  Upon reporting to 
the hospital, the patient is dropped into the labyrinth.  There is one 
circuitous path to treatment—the path set out by the hospital.  Along 
the path, a variety of things happen to the patient at the hands of well-
meaning folks who are trying to make him well, but they have all 
different kinds of connections to the hospital.264 
The breakdowns that lead to injuries often occur across multiple stages 
of care involving two or more clinicians.265  Often errors by the system 
precipitate, activate, or amplify the error by the individual physician.266  
Many details regarding the injury, its causes, sources, and results are 
often unknown at the time the lawsuit is filed.267  This can make 
determining which physician or hospital employee is responsible for the 
negligence very difficult for the patient-victim.268   
 
 262. See, e.g., Losito v. Kruse, 24 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1940); Comer v. Risko, 833 N.E.2d 712, 
718 (Ohio 2005); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ohio 1994). 
 263. Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role of 
Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599, 600-01 (2008).  This 
article is based on a large empirical study of closed malpractice claims conducted from 2001-2006 
called, The Malpractice Insurers Medical Error Prevention and Surveillance Study (MIMEPS).  Id. 
at 601.  “Among 1452 reviewed files, 889 were judged to involve injury to a patient due to one or 
more medical errors.”  Id. 
 264. Comer, 833 N.E.2d at 719 (Pfeifer, J, dissenting). 
 265. Mello & Studdert, supra note 263, at 605.  60% of injuries involved 2 or more clinicians, 
25% involved 3 or more.  Id.   
 266. Id. at 609-13. 
 267. Id. at 613. 
 268. May & Aulisio, supra note 3, at 140-42. 
The burden of “discovery” of injury due to medical errors is placed solely on the victim.   
Patients’ lack of expertise in identifying when a medical error has occurred coupled with 
the “culture of silence” induced by the current malpractice system, makes obtaining 
appropriate compensation very difficult.  Indeed, it is estimated that less than 2 percent 
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This is in direct contrast to legal malpractice.  There will usually be 
very little difficulty in determining the negligent party in a law firm.269   
[A]lmost all plaintiffs will be able to identify a specific attorney who 
committed some wrong on their case.  More than seventy percent of all 
legal malpractice claims filed between 2004 and 2007 were filed 
against firms with less than five attorneys.  Slightly more than thirty-
seven percent of all claims over the same span were filed against sole 
practitioners.270   
There is not a substantial burden placed on plaintiffs by Wuerth as 
applied to legal malpractice, but the same is not true for medical 
malpractice.   
If the law as laid out in Wuerth is applied to medical malpractice, 
the patient-victim may feel obligated to include everyone involved in his 
or her care as a defendant in the suit.  The practice of predicating 
hospital liability on the requirement that the negligent physician be a 
named defendant can lead to a “broad sweep of potential defendants” 
increasing the cost, and complexity, of litigation in general.271  This 
result stems from multiple innocent parties being dragged into litigation, 
lengthening of the court process and the time for recovery for the injured 
party, increasing medical malpractice insurance, and preventing 
hospitals from instituting self-insurance systems because they would be 
forced to undergo huge defense costs due to the number of defendants 
sued.272   
Requiring the individual agent or practitioner to be named as a 
defendant in order for a derivative claim of vicarious liability to go 
forward against the hospital could result in a disproportionate share of 
the damages associated with medical injures to be borne by individual 
health care workers rather than hospitals.273  It is appropriate for 
hospitals to bear their share of the damages resulting from medical 
 
of injuries due to negligence result in malpractice claims. 
Id. at 142.   
 269. Jesse T. Mosser, Survey of Ohio Law, C. Legal Malpractice: Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1209, 1214 (2010). 
 270. Id.  The statistics indicate that in a large majority of legal malpractice cases, the plaintiff 
should not have trouble identifying the appropriate defendant because they know exactly who to 
blame for the malpractice.  Id.   
 271. Mello & Studdert, supra note 263, at 613. 
 272. Id. at 615-20. 
 273. Id. at 615. 
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malpractice.274  Hospitals provide the most complex services, they are 
the most organized medical sites, they treat the sickest patients, and their 
care gives rise to the most cases addressed by malpractice liability, yet 
“individual physicians bear the lion’s share of liability costs.”275  
Hospitals and other large entities are directly implicated in the majority 
of harmful medical errors, and tort deterrence—one of the primary goals 
of malpractice liability—is best targeted at the institutional level.276  
Targeting individuals results in lost opportunities to use the legal system 
to improve patient safety.277  Thus the goal of deterrence is undermined 
by effectively eliminating hospital liability in a large proportion of cases, 
as the application of the Wuerth doctrine to medical malpractice will do. 
Public policy also favors limiting Wuerth in order to avoid unjust 
results in those medical malpractice cases that have merit.  Under 
Wuerth, an injured plaintiff who is unable to discover—or who failed to 
name—the negligent party prior to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations, will be unable to collect on their claim against the hospital, 
medical center, or employer regardless of the merits of the claim.  If 
Wuerth is limited, a medical malpractice case that has merit will have 
the opportunity to go forward, while a case without merit will ultimately 
fail.  In order for a medical malpractice claim to succeed against a 
hospital, the plaintiff must “first prove malpractice against the physician 
. . . [then] the agent’s negligence is imputed to the principal, without 
regard to fault on the principal’s part.”278  This is the standard and 
accepted doctrine of respondeat superior.  This standard will continue to 
protect hospitals, resulting in liability only where negligence can be 
proven. 
In examining the issue of whether Wuerth should be extended to 
apply to medical malpractice cases, the Ohio Supreme Court should 
 
 274. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Robert H. Miller & David W. Shapiro, Paths to Reducing Medical 
Injury: Professional Liability and Discipline vs. Patient Safety—and the Need for a Third Way, 29 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 369, 371 (2001). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Mello & Studdert, supra note 263, at 618.  Health care institutions are in the best position 
to prevent accidents; hospitals would be more responsive than individual physicians in 
implementing changes that would result in less injuries because there would not be the stigmatism 
of failure that individual liability for a physician carries; physician efforts may be less effective in 
preventing injury especially where the injury results from breakdowns in care between physicians or 
by multiple clinicians; and many system-wide inefficiencies could only be addressed on a systemic 
level.  Id. at 620-22.   
 277. Id. at 621.  Individual physicians, although they may heighten their individual vigilance, 
are powerless to effect systemic change.  Id. at 619.  “Hospitals would be more responsive . . . to 
incentives sent by the tort system.”  Id. at 618.   
 278. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 41, at 439-40. 
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clarify the use of the word “liability” as used in Wuerth.  Is liability 
based on the actual ability to hold the agent liable—as Wuerth seems to 
suggest and cases since have held?  Or must the plaintiff only prove the 
negligence of the agent in order to attribute liability to the principal as 
indicated in Sawicki?279  The court should affirm the proposition that an 
injured party has a “right of action against either the master or the 
servant, or against both, in separate actions” as has been held in Ohio for 
nearly a century.280 
If Wuerth requires an adjudication of liability of the individual, then 
applying it to medical malpractice creates a new law with harsher 
consequences.  There may be several reasons that a plaintiff may not 
include a negligent tortfeasor as a party:  the plaintiff may fail to 
discover the tortfeasor, choose not to include him or her in the suit, 
voluntarily dismiss the tortfeasor from the case, or the tortfeasor may 
have personal immunity.  To hold that a claim against an employer 
under a theory of respondeat superior is barred if an injured party does 
not name the negligent employee as a defendant goes against the great 
weight of the settled law in Ohio and throughout the nation.  It also 
serves to seriously limit the ability of the injured parties to recover for 
the damages inflicted upon them through negligence.  To hold 
differently has absurd and unjust results.281   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Respondeat superior is designed to place the responsibility for an 
employee’s actions on the person who has the most incentive to control 
those actions and who tends to benefit the most from the relationship.282  
Historically, it has been held that an employer is the person who will 
benefit the most from the actions of the employee, and therefore, should 
also be the one who is responsible for injuries that are caused by that 
 
 279. State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cnty. Ct. Com.Pl., 931 N.E.2d 1082, 1088-89 (Ohio 2010) 
(the doctrine of respondeat superior operates by imputing to the employer the acts of the tortfeasor, 
not the tortfeasor’s liability). 
 280. Losito v. Kruse, 24 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1940).  Losito relies on an Ohio Supreme 
Court decision from 1883, which holds that “a judgment against an agent for a fraud committed 
while acting in the scope of his agency . . . is not bar to an action against the principal for the same 
fraud.”  Losito, 24 N.E.2d at 707; Maple v. Cincinnati, H. & D. R.R. Co., 40 Ohio St. 313, Reporter 
Holdings (1883).  It is settled law that the master is liable for the actions of the servant acting within 
the scope of his agency or employment.  E.g., Losito, 24 N.E.2d at 705.   
 281. See Henry v. Mandell-Brown, 2010-Ohio-3832, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st. Dist.).  See also 
Tisdale v. Toledo Hosp., No. CI 03-4247 (Ohio C.P. Lucas Cnty. 2010), appeal filed, No. L-11-
1005 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. Jan. 10, 2011).   
 282. See text accompanying supra note 4.   
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employee during the scope of employment.283  The doctrine ensures that 
an injured party is made whole and that burdens and costs are effectively 
distributed throughout society.284 
Hospitals were historically able to avoid this liability through 
charitable immunity, but as the role of hospitals in society changed, so 
did the public’s desire to insulate hospitals from taking responsibility for 
protecting their patients.285  Ohio has demonstrated a strong policy of 
ensuring that an injured party is compensated.  The courts systematically 
removed hospitals’ protections and enforced increasing levels of liability 
upon hospitals for the negligence and malpractice of the physicians and 
staff they chose to employ.286   
If not limited, Wuerth could invalidate the progress made by Ohio 
courts.  The application of the narrow decision in Wuerth to medical 
malpractice removes some of the protections that have been built into 
the medical system to ensure that the injured party is made whole.287  
This goes against the trend of cases both in Ohio and throughout the 
nation and reverses the substantial gains that have been made in this area 
over the past several decades.  The results of reversing these advances 
will be inequitable and will prevent injured parties from having their day 
in court.  The Supreme Court of Ohio should clearly limit Wuerth to its 
facts and thereby allow medical malpractice plaintiffs to plead and prove 
their cases. 
 
 283. See Holiday, supra note 259, §407. 
 284. See May & Aulisio, supra note 3, at 138. 
 285. See text accompanying supra note 54. 
 286. See supra Part II.E. 
 287. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 207. 
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